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5American liberalism and capitalism from 
William Jennings Bryan to Barack Obama*
Geoff Robinson
DEAkIN UNIVERSITY
A b s t r Ac t
American capitalism has generated remarkable prosperity. However 
problems of opportunism and bounded rationality have meant that 
American capitalism has also generated economic crises, unpopular 
levels of inequality and subordinated workers and small producers to 
employers and national markets in contradiction to American ideals of 
republican independence. American liberals have sought the support of 
those aggrieved by the process of capitalist development but to secure 
an electoral majority they have had to offer citizens a plausible program 
for economic growth and thus to support capitalism. ‘Corporate liberalism’ 
has been the result. Each generation of liberals has offered solutions to 
the problems of bounded rationality and opportunism from Progressive 
antitrust to Bill Clinton’s pursuit of Microsoft. Each generation of capitalists 
has also offered solutions to the problems of bounded rationality and 
opportunism from the giant corporations of the late nineteenth-century 
to the financialized capitalism of recent years. Liberalism and capitalism 
have informed and shaped each other. Each rapprochement between 
capitalism and liberalism has broken down amidst economic crisis and 
political realignment. The economic crisis that commenced in 2007 may 
presage a political realignment comparable to that of the 1890s or 1930s. 
* My thanks are due to comments from participants at the Social Democratic Parties and 
Business symposium organised by the Business and Labour History group at the University 
of Sydney on 28 September 2009 and at the Deakin University Centre for Citizenship & 
Globalisation Seminar on 21 April 2011 and to Dr. Elizabeth Sanders from Cornell University 
for a copy of her article ‘Antitrust and American democracy’ and to Dr. Michael Muetzelfeldt 
of Victoria University for advice on an earlier version of this paper. Electoral statistics are from 
David Leip, “Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections,” http://uselectionatlas.org.
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Introduction
Since the late nineteenth century American businesses, consumers and workers have experienced 
a capitalist economy that has generated hierarchy, inequality and crisis together with remarkable 
economic growth. The failings of capitalism have frequently impelled voters to the left but voters have 
continued to find the promise of capitalist prosperity feasible. As a result since the late nineteenth 
century liberalism has seen out rivals such as populism and socialism to become the dominant 
political philosophy of the American left. Liberals promised voters the benefits of capitalism and 
also to alleviate its disadvantages. In recent decades American-style liberalism informed the ‘new 
revisionism’ of European and Australian social democracy. Yet time and time again capitalist crisis 
have called into question the accommodation of liberalism and capitalism. In 1896 the Democrats 
for the first time explicitly appealed to voters aggrieved by their experience of capitalism, but voters 
rejected their appeal. In 2008 Barack Obama swept to power as nominee of a Democratic Party more 
homogenously liberal than at any time in its history but the dream of a new liberal hegemony has 
crumbled as the crisis of American capitalism that commenced in 2007 has continued.
The American economy outside of the slave south in the first decades after the Revolution 
approximated Adam Smith’s vision of a society of artisans, merchants, farmers and small producers 
whose economic activities were coordinated by local markets, wage-labourers constituted only 
a minority of the workforce and many could realistically anticipate becoming employers in their 
own right. America it seemed was born liberal. The American state was a jumble of autonomous 
institutions rather than a European-style central authority with little impact on the everyday lives 
of citizens. Liberalism was for Americans not just a set of institutions but a hegemonic culture of 
rationality, acquisitiveness and a propensity to group formation. The southern defeat in the Civil War 
seemed to mark the definite triumph of this liberalism over the slave power. 1 
In the decades after the Civil War this liberal vision was challenged by the rise of capitalism; the 
forms of market exchange remained but their content changed as small producers were forced to 
contend in national markets or become wage-labourers. The development of corporate capitalism 
in the late nineteenth century replaced market coordination in many large enterprises by the 
visible hand of capitalist authority. Politics was transformed by the development of a more coherent 
national administrative apparatus, whilst political parties came to appeal to voters on economic 
as well as ethno-cultural grounds. The liberal consensus broke up and ‘liberalism’ emerged as a 
self-aware ideological project on the part of intellectuals and politicians. Citizens, consumers and 
capitalists had to live with capitalist hierarchy and inequality, economic crises from the financial 
panic of 1893 to that of 2007 and eventually participation in mass consumption and affluence to a 
level unimaginable in the old Smithian economy.
The achievements and the failings of American capitalism were inextricably linked. The complexity 
and scale of modern capitalist society was a demonstration of the unparalleled power of markets to 
synthesize human knowledge and unite the energies of disparate individuals. However corporate 
structures and financial markets offered imperfect solutions to the problems of opportunism and 
bounded rationality. In each economic generation contemporary observers would claim that 
capitalist history had ended with the development of a set of institutions to resolve these problems; 
from the managerial capitalism of the 1950s to the financialized capitalism of the last twenty years. 
Each subsequent generation saw these hopes collapse. 
1 Alexander De Tocqueville, Democracy in America: And Two Essays on America (London: Penguin 2003); Louis 
Hartz, “United States History in a New Perspective,” in The founding of new societies: studies in the history of 
the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia, ed. Louis Hartz (New York, NY: Harcourt, 
Brace & World 1964); Karl Marx, Capital: a critique of political economy, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1976); Alfred D. Chandler, The visible hand : the managerial revolution in American business (Cambridge, MA.: 
Belknap Press, 1977).
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Each crisis of American capitalism encouraged liberals as political activists to develop new programs 
and liberals as intellectuals to develop new models of capitalism. Liberals cited capitalist crises to 
advocate radical transformations in the American political economy on behalf of the victims of 
such crises, or made the pessimistic prediction that liberal capitalism would give way to a new 
statist political order in which a centralized bureaucratic state, reformed on European bureaucratic 
models, would act in the collective interests of capital. However capitalism responded to each crisis 
and to liberal critiques by the development of new solutions to the problems of opportunism and 
bounded rationality. 
capitalism and liberalism in the long-run
The first states emerged around five thousand years ago. Initially they did little more extract an 
economic surplus from their population and applied this surplus towards the construction of a 
military apparatus. Simple extraction of a surplus was a limited strategy for the expansion of state 
power, without a major increase in economic productivity. This increase in productivity was initially 
underpinned by the provision of public goods such as system of property rights which supported the 
Smithian dynamic of the division of labour and specialisation. The massive acceleration in productivity 
growth that occurred under capitalism required more than a market, it required the establishment 
of businesses enterprises that competed among themselves subject to the threat of bankruptcy and 
whose internal operations were organised in part by hierarchies rather than markets.2 
State-based societies and business corporations competed successfully against stateless societies 
(and later against state socialism) and against the artisans, merchants and farmers of the Smithian 
economy. States and corporations were uniquely effective in the production of goods and of 
coercive power, this power took the form not just of weaponry but of technologies, what John Hicks 
calls the ‘administrative revolution’ of bureaucracy and positive law. These forms of rule were more 
adaptable than custom and tradition. European imperialism rested not only on military force but also 
the ability of bureaucratic structures to successfully incorporate traditional political formations, such 
as patrimonial monarchies, into a hierarchy of command. Two other innovations have been central 
to the effectiveness of the modern state: democracy and political parties. Democratic governments 
are less likely to act as predatory states that extract a surplus for private ends. Democracy creates an 
incentive for governments to pursue policies that promote popular goals of rising living standards. 
Political parties reduce information costs for voters and assist them to make informed choices 
between candidates and enable parliamentarians to cooperate more effectively. Affluence made 
possible the ‘imagined community’ of the nation state. The rise of capitalism and the state apparently 
reduced human freedom; workers rejected the authority of capitalists, citizens grumbled about 
bureaucracies, voters complained about political parties. At the same these institutions increased 
fostered positive freedom: the ability of individuals to control their environment.3
2 David Christian, Maps of time : an introduction to big history (Berkeley., California: University of California 
Press, 2004)., 245-248; M. Mann, The sources of social power: A history of power from the beginning to AD 
1760, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)., 137-142; William J. Baumol, The free-market 
innovation machine : analyzing the growth miracle of capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); 
Douglass C. North, Structure and change in economic history, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1981).
3 Dennis C Mueller, Public choice III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)., 9-14; Ellen M. Wood, 
The origin of capitalism: a longer view (London: Verso 2002)., 166-81; Marx, Capital, 1., 549-50; Herbert L. A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961)., 89-94; John Aldrich, Why parties?: The origin and 
transformation of political parties in America (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1995)., 28-65; Richard 
Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica 4, no. 16 (1937); Margaret Levi, Of rule and revenue (Berkeley, 
CA.: University of California Press, 1989); John Hicks, A theory of economic history (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1973); Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991); Ronald Robinson, “Non-European foundations of European Imperialism: sketch for a 
theory of collaboration,” in Studies in the theory of imperialism, ed. Robert Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: 
Longman, 1972)., 120
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Liberalism is more than a system of ideas; it is a form of what Martin Sklar calls a production-
property system. Politics, as Otto Hintze argued, is an entrepreneurial activity in which politicians 
contend for dominion and power at the same time whilst the ability of states to exercise power 
over other states is largely dependent on their economic strength. Capitalism is a social movement: 
the development of enterprise structures is the result of political struggles and contests. The 
development of liberal ideas is also a political process, ideas may be created by individual thinkers 
but to exercise an influence on politics they must became an ideology that can mobilise a broader 
constituency.4 
Liberalism as a system of belief is famously associated with the image of the path breaking free 
intellectuals from John Stuart Mill to John Rawls or Robert Nozick. But liberalism as a political-
intellectual project has to survive in a world of intellectual competition and to respond to a 
changing external world. The weakness of the American party system has facilitated the rise of 
‘policy entrepreneurs’ who market ideas from the academy to policy-makers. The rise of corporate 
capitalism posed a major problem for American liberal thought. Since the late nineteenth century 
American liberalism was also shaped by historical events and intellectual trends. These included 
disillusionment with the consequences of World War I, then the perception of World War II as a 
‘good war’, the ‘anti-totalitarian’ mobilisation of the 1950s, the social upheavals of the 1960s, the 
disillusioning impact of the Viet Nam war and the recent rise of populist conservatism. Different 
paradigms of liberalism have largely risen and fallen due to generational change rather than 
changes in the perspectives of individual activists.5 
American liberalism has sought an alternative to the rival traditions of populism and libertarianism. 
To libertarians the capitalist firm is a nexus of contracts rather than a system of power exercised 
over workers or an entity distinct from shareholders. Libertarianism implied a state restricted to 
the protection of property and contractual rights. Populists took the opposite position: they feared 
that contractual relations, beyond the most personal and immediate, could mask power relations. 
Populists wanted the state to limit the ability of the powerful to use contractual forms as a tool of 
power.6 
Both populists and libertarians drew on Adam Smith’s legacy. To libertarians the corporate capitalist 
economy resulted from the propensity of self-interested humans to ‘truck, barter and exchange’. 
To populists corporate capitalism and finance destroyed the Smithian economy of small producers 
who dealt as equals man to man. Smith himself was sceptical of ‘prodigals’ and ‘projectors’ and 
feared that banks facilitated speculation and he was suspicious of the propensity of businesses to 
collude in price fixing. In the United States however it was often small businesses that were most 
prone to engage in formal price-fixing and collusion and their right to do so was long defended by 
their political champions. 7
Liberals rejected populism and libertarianism. They contended that libertarianism denied the reality 
of economic inequality, the subordination of workers and the barriers to market entry. But unlike 
4 Martin J. Sklar, “Thoughts on Capitalism and Socialism: Utopian and Realistic,” The Journal of the Gilded Age 
and Progressive Era 2, no. 4 (2003)., 366; Otto Hintze, “Economics and Politics in the Age of Modern Capital-
ism (1929),” in The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1975)., 428-429
5 Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American law, 1836-1937 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 
1991)., 5-7; Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 1936)., 32-48
6 Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American law., 5-7, 82; Eugene F Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of 
the Firm,” The Journal of Political Economy 88, no. 2 (1980); Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “Production, 
information costs, and economic organization,” The American Economic Review 62, no. 5 (1972).
7 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976)., 
21; Thomas McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Franices Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred 
E. kahn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984)., 101-106
discovery
application
excellence 9
populists liberals believed that complex private contractual arrangements enabled individuals to 
cooperate for mutual benefit.8
Liberalism was also challenged by corporatism and socialism. Corporatists positioned themselves 
between liberalism and libertarianism. They argued for the inevitability of large scale hierarchical 
corporate capitalist organisation subject to regulation and control by a strong national government 
in the public interest. Between liberalis and populists were socialists who generalized from the 
greater efficiency of large scale corporate capitalist enterprises to advocate economy-wide 
democratic economic planning. 
Socialists and corporatists were both preoccupied with the problems of opportunism and bounded 
rationality; they believed that the actions of individual profit-maximizing capitalist enterprises 
had in the aggregate negative consequences such as overproduction, excess capacity and 
inadequate levels of innovation. Liberals shared these concerns but to them the socialist alternative 
was dramatically at variance with American traditions and from the 1930s was implicated in the 
totalitarian challenge to liberal democracy. Liberals also feared corporatism empowered business 
interests over the public and fostered corruption and populist authoritarianism.9
the emergence of political liberalism
Nineteenth century America combined a highly developed economy and an undeveloped state. 
A national market and rule of law encouraged a dynamic Smithian market economy, and major 
increases in population, technological levels and consumption. During these years the state 
apparatus remained frozen in the model established by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
Mass parties together with a highly political judiciary evolved to undertake national governance 
responsibilities for which the archaic state apparatus was ill-suited. Party élites colluded to exclude 
the question of slavery from contestation, and when this exclusion finally collapsed normal politics 
was replaced by civil war from 1860 to 1865 and then military occupation of the defeated south 
until 1877. Party conflict in these decades reflected fundamental social divisions about the nature of 
the American state.10 
In the two decades after 1877 party leaders used the memory of the Civil War to their rally 
supporters. Parties failed to respond to social change during this period. The American economy 
was transformed by the shift of economic activity to the north east, a decline in the economic 
and social status of farmers and small producers, price deflation, and the rise of large capitalist 
enterprises, particularly banking and railroads. The personal exchange relations of the old Smithian 
economy gave way to impersonal exchanges between small producers and large corporations, 
whilst enterprise managers employed the law of contract to establish workplace relations of 
status.11 
8 Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American law., 67-78, 129-34, 274-80; Morton J. Horwitz, The transformation of 
American law, 1870-1960: The crisis of legal orthodoxy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994)., 36, 
50, 165-67; Barbara Welke, Recasting American liberty: gender, race, law, and the railroad revolution, 1865-1920 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001)., 3-42
9 William J Bryan, “The Problem of the Trusts,” New York Times, 11 November 1911; S. Milkis, “Franklin D. Roos-
evelt, the Economic Constitutional Order, and the New Politics of Presidential Leadership,” in The New Deal 
and the Triumph of Liberalism, ed. S. Milkis and J. Mileur (Amherst, MA.: University of Massachusetts Press, 
2002)., 36-37.
10 David Hounsell, From the American System to Mass Production: 1800-1932 (Baltimore, MD.: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1984)., 51-61; Stephen Skowronek, Building a new American state: The expansion of national 
administrative capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)., 19-35.
11 Hounsell, American System., 110-120, 205; Tony A Freyer, Regulating big business: antitrust in Great Britain 
and America, 1880-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)., 17; Marx, Capital, 1., 549-553, 902; 
Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 
1996)., 183-200.
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In the later nineteenth century third parties, such as the Populists, challenged the Republicans 
and Democrats, and supported an alliance of artisans, farmers and small business people against 
the new capitalism. The Populists polled 8.5% at the 1892 Presidential election but most voters 
remained loyal to the major parties. Democrats and Republicans had well-established regional and 
social bases but the balance between the two parties was dependent on voters’ evaluations of 
their ability to provide public goods of honest administration and economic stability. Substantial 
economic issues were excluded from debate as neither major party knew how to respond to 
economic downturns. The Democrats stranglehold on the south reflected the traumas of civil war, 
Reconstruction and the disenfranchisement of black Republican voters, but the south was also a 
stronghold of anti-monopoly and inflationary sentiment. The Republican support of tariff protection 
for manufactures was unpopular among many farmers, but it was attractive to many workers, 
particularly during economic recessions. Tariffs offended against the principles of classical liberalism, 
together with Republican corruption, and disenchantment with the results of Reconstruction, 
they contributed to a culturally based disaffection among some higher income, formerly staunch 
Republican, voters in the north-east, the so-called ‘Mugwumps’. Conservative Democrat Grover 
Cleveland victor of the 1884 and 1892 presidential elections appealed to this constituency. Political 
elites also accommodated popular antimonopoly sentiment as demonstrated by bipartisan support 
for the 1887 Interstate Commerce Commission Act and the 1890 Sherman Act, which declared 
restraints of trade illegal. The Sherman Act would underpin ‘antitrust’ politics.12
In the Presidential election of 1896 the new capitalism finally took centre stage. A major economic 
downturn had commenced in 1893 after bank and railroad failures. The failure of the administration 
of Grover Cleveland to effectively respond to the economic crisis and its support for state 
repression of strikes led Democrats (and the Populists) to nominate radical William Jennings Bryan 
as presidential candidate in 1896. Bryan called for workers and producers to unite against banks, 
railroads, high tariffs and for the monetisation of silver to increase price levels. Bryan’s rhetoric like 
that Barack Obama over a century later generated extraordinary enthusiasm.13
Bryan’s great political problem was that by 1896 capitalist development had undercut the dream 
of a populist alliance of producers. From 1870 to 1890 the portion of male workers in agriculture 
fell from 53% to 42.6%. Many union leaders supported Bryan but union membership was tiny. 
Urban workers were culturally distant from the rural evangelical Protestant Democratic base. 
Many workers blamed Democrats as the incumbents for the depression, and feared the impact of 
inflation and tariff reductions on wages and employment. Bryan alienated middle-class reformers 
who had supported conservative Democrats against Republican corruption. The Democrats’ vision 
of the producers’ republic was popular but threatened the other great national vision of material 
advancement in which workers, unlike farmers, had participated; real wages rose during the 1880s 
and early 1890s. The debate about economic policy was not merely a battle of interest groups but 
reflected divergent cultural values.14
12 Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: the antimonopoly tradition and the politics of finance in America 
(New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of reform: farmers, workers, and 
the American state, 1877-1917 (Chicago, Il.: University Of Chicago Press, 1999)., 34-36, 194-195, 219, 271; 
Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, The age of enterprise: a social history of industrial America, Rev. ed. 
(New York,: Harper, 1961); M. Keller, “Trade Policy in Historical Perspective,” in Taking Stock: American Govern-
ment in the Twentieth Century, ed. M. Keller and R. S. Melnick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999)., 
18-20.
13 W. J. Bryan, “Cross of Gold,” http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=163.
14 Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American law., 208-213; Alba Edwards, Comparative Occupational Statistics for 
the United States, 1870 to 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943)., 101; Gwendolyn Mink, 
Old labor and new immigrants in American political development: union, party, and state, 1875-1920 (New York, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1990)., 142-48; Republican Party, “Platform,” http://projects.vassar.edu/1896/
gopplatform.html; Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900 (New 
York, NY: Free Press, 1970); Sanders, Roots of reform., 84-86, 138-47; Freyer, Regulating big business., 15.
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At the November 1896 presidential election Bryan was soundly defeated by Republican William 
McKinley. The Democrats probably won most of the 1892 Populist vote but they lost ground 
elsewhere particularly in the more industrial and working-class states of the north-east. This is 
illustrated by a comparison of Democratic and Populist support by states from 1892 to 1896.
tAble 1: PeArson correlAtIon PresIdentIAl vote for non-
southern stAtes 1892-189615
1896 Democratic
1892 Democratic -0.40
1892 Populist + Democratic 0.76
debating the new corporate order
Karl Marx argued that different modes of production rise or fall by their ability to encourage the 
development of the means of production:
At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict 
with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms 
– with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From 
forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins 
an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the 
transformation of the whole immense superstructure.16
Corporate property was a new form of property. From 1895 to 1904 more than 1800 firms were 
absorbed by corporate mergers. As a transformation in property relations the merger wave of 
this period was second only to the emancipation of the slaves during the Civil War. This transition 
took place under an (imperfect) democracy but it led to a revolution in electoral politics. The 1896 
Presidential election was a major victory for American conservatism over a Democratic Party that for 
the first time offered a critique of capitalism from the left. The 1896 election initiated a Republican 
hegemony; from 1896 to 1928 they averaged 50.3% at presidential elections and the Democrats 
40.8%, and electoral turnout notably declined. The Republicans lost the Presidency to a Democrat, 
Woodrow Wilson, only twice in 1912 and 1916; the first defeat followed a major split in the party 
when former President Theodore Roosevelt led a breakaway Progressive party. The Democrats 
became a party of the peripheral south and to a lesser degree the west, and polled poorly in states 
with a large industrial workforce.17
The Republican ascendancy demonstrated that the democratic alternation of parties in 
government requires a social consensus. The Civil War occurred when social divisions between 
slave and free labour coincided with partisan divisions. Normal electoral completion resumed after 
the end of Reconstruction which ratified a new national compromise: slavery was abolished but 
racial inequality remained. After 1896 the nature of the American political economy remained so 
deeply contested that a Democratic victory was inconceivable. Party allegiances forged during 
1860-77 facilitated voter choice but enabled opportunistic behaviour by party elites, conservative 
15 Southern is defined as the states of the old Confederacy.
16 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New York, NY.: International, 1970)., 21
17 Sanders, Roots of reform., 26; Walter D. Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970)., 51-54; Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The great merger movement in American 
business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1985)., 1-2.
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Democrats ignored their populist base to pursue disenchanted north-eastern Republicans. Bryan’s 
nomination was a defeat for party elites but his electoral fate showed that voters valued the positive 
freedom of capitalist prosperity over the negative liberty of the Smithian economy. After 1896 
the letter of the Sherman Act became unamendable holy writ but state governments competed 
to liberalise laws on business incorporation to encourage investment and thus undermined the 
Smithian economy.18
The late nineteenth century transformations in capitalism challenged the global left. American 
Populists had believed that the new order was an alien imposition on the Republic; European 
socialists anticipated market saturation and economic collapse. Instead capitalism boomed from 
the mid 1890s; gold discoveries ended price deflation, the new chemical and industrial industries 
grew rapidly, and corporate concentration surged. In Europe the new capitalism encouraged both 
socialist revisionists and radicals. To revisionists the new capitalism offered economic stability, as 
capitalist planning replaced the anarchy of production, and the prospect of new alliances with the 
growing white-collar workforce or small producers against monopoly. To radicals the new capitalism 
instead meant imperialism and a heightened subordination of the great mass of the population to 
monopoly. The American debate echoed these themes. Some former populists became socialists 
but most remained Democrats.19 
Despite rapid economic growth in the United States real wages were stagnant. Usually we 
would have expected this to generate political resistance but the Republicans maintained their 
ascendancy due to the ineffectiveness of the Democrats and also the willingness of the state 
apparatus, including the judiciary, to accommodate popular anxiety about the new capitalism. The 
Republican ascendancy of the gilded age demonstrates that although stagnant living standards 
and growing inequality may create the potential for political mobilisation this is not inevitable. In 
2011 whether ‘occupy Wall Street’ would inspire a broad protest movement against the second 
gilded age remained uncertain.20 
Many Republicans and capitalists wanted the courts to interpret the Sherman Act in accordance 
with English common and statute law so as to allow reasonable restraints of trade. They focused on 
the problem of ‘ruinous competition’: where opportunistic competition between large corporations 
with heavy fixed costs forced them to reduce prices to a level that covered no more than short-term 
operating costs with the inevitable results that enterprises were forced to run at a loss. The literature 
on ‘ruinous competition’ challenged traditional laisser-faire economics and was influenced by 
institutionalism and even Marxism but advocated a cartelised and regulated capitalism. The courts 
considered the ruinous competition argument unproven, and tended to argue that the Sherman 
Act outlawed all restraints of trade, and over time the judiciary demonstrated notable legal creativity 
to extend the net of the Sherman Act from cartels to include market-dominant mergers. Yet at the 
same time as the courts rejected the arguments of corporate capitalists they applied the Sherman 
Act aggressively against organised labour. 21 
18 Harvey N. Prechel, Big business and the state: Historical transitions and corporate transformation, 1880s-1990s 
(New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000)., 37-38; Horwitz, Transformation of American law., 
84; Harold J. Laski, The State in Theory and Practice (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1935)., 136-150
19 Sanders, Roots of reform., 60; Lamoreaux, Merger movement., 1-6; Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction 
of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988)., 44-46; Lucio Colletti, “Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second International,” in From Rousseau to 
Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society, ed. Lucio Colleti (New York, NY.: Monthly Review Press, 1969)..
20 Paul H. Douglas, Real wages in the United States, 1890-1926 (Boston, MA.: Houghton Mifflin, 1930)., 390-391; 
Peter R. Shergold, Working-Class Life: the ‘American standard’ in comparative perspective, 1899-1913 (Pitts-
burgh, PA.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982)., 207-230
21 Northern Securities Company v. United States, 197 United States Reports 193(1904); Chandler, Visible Hand., 
134-55; Sklar, American Capitalism., 57-85; Freyer, Regulating big business., 23-29, 47-50; Hovenkamp, 
Enterprise and American law., 298-17; Lamoreaux, Merger movement., 109-110; Michael Perelman, “Constant 
Capital and the Crisis in Contemporary Capitalism: Echoes from the Late Nineteenth Century,” http://
michaelperelman.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/constan.pdf; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 
221 United States Supreme Court Reports 1(1911)., 50-57; J. Dyson Heydon, The restraint of trade doctrine, 3 
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It was only as the Democrats political fortunes recovered after 1908 that the judiciary changed tack. 
In the American Tobacco and Standard Oil cases in 1911 the Supreme Court declared that reasonable 
restraints of trade were permissible under the Sherman Act but upheld dissolution orders against 
the two companies on the grounds that they had pursued deliberate policy of monopolisation. The 
decision was condemned by both Bryanite and conservative Democrats.22 
The Republicans after 1896 sought to dilute popular opposition to the new capitalism. Theodore 
Roosevelt became President after the assassination of William McKinley in 1901 and instigated 
several prosecutions of major corporations under the Sherman Act. This policy appealed to 
Democrats, who were unexcited by their Party’s conservative 1904 candidate. At the 1904 election 
Roosevelt won a landslide victory. In 1908 Bryan again contested the presidency with strong 
support from organised labour, spurred into politics by the judicial application of the Sherman 
Act against unions, but he was soundly defeated, despite a severe recession that followed a 
financial crisis in 1907.23 Bryan’s populism frightened swinging voters, but the Democratic base was 
unenthused without him.
Roosevelt appealed to populist voters, and entered popular memory as a ‘trust-buster’ but he 
rejected the populist critique of industrial capitalism. He believed strongly that large corporations 
were more efficient and productive than smaller enterprises, but should be subject to regulation 
in the public interest. Roosevelt aspired to a government-business partnership but his critics 
interpreted this to mean the arbitrary exercise of executive power to favour particular business 
groups. His vision of strong state would both attract and repel generations of liberals.24
Early twentieth-century American Socialists had criticised the accommodation between liberals and 
capitalism. The political polarization of the interwar years and the opportunism of the Communist 
Party quelled radical critique until in the 1950s C. Wright Mills described a ‘corporate liberalism’ that 
united business, state and labour elites together with militarised capitalism. In the next decade 
Mills’ work inspired the ‘new left’ historians to argue that the reforms of Roosevelt and Wilson 
manifested a ‘corporate liberalism’, that they were the work of far seeing capitalists who recognised 
the need to stabilise the economic order, guard against socialism and reduce competition. In their 
polemic against the claims of liberalism and their argument that regulation served the interests of 
regulated industries rather than the public interest the new left found some common ground with 
the libertarian right. The corporate liberal hypothesis anticipated later structural Marxist arguments 
that capitalists by themselves would pursue their own opportunistic interest even when this 
threatened the long-run viability of capitalism. Marx himself was ambiguous on this question, at 
times he argued that reforms could result from the political action of the working class but often 
downplayed the significance of these reforms and suggested they actually served the collective 
interests of capitalists.25 
ed. (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008)., 2-3, 27-32; ibid; Karen Orren, “The Laws of Industrial Organiza-
tion, 1870-1920,” in The Cambridge History of Law in America, vol. 2, The Long Nineteenth-Century (1789-1920), 
ed. Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2008)., 538-545; 
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 290(1897).
22 “May Amend Sherman Law,” New York Times, 16 May 1911; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States; 
United States v. American Tobacco, 221 United States Supreme Court Reports 106(1911); William J. Bryan, 
“Bryan’s Thirteen Questions,” New York Times, 18 July 1911; “Platform is Ready for the Convention,” New York 
Times, 28 June 1912.
23 Sanders, Roots of reform., 87-89, 99
24 Theodore Roosevelt, The new nationalism (New York: The Outlook Company, 1910)., 14-15; ibid; Sklar, Ameri-
can Capitalism., 334-48
25 Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and regulation: 1877-1916 (New York, NY.: Norton, 1970); Martin J. Sklar, “Woodrow 
Wilson and the developmental imperatives of modern U. S. liberalism,” in The United States as a Developing 
Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s, ed. Martin J Sklar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992); Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American law., 134-135; Skowronek, New American 
State., 130-137; Nicos Poulantzas, Political power and social classes (London: New Left Books, 1978); James 
Weinstein, The corporate ideal in the liberal state, 1900-1918 (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1968); C. Wright 
Mills, The power elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Marx, Capital, 1., 395-416, 619, 626, 635, 903; 
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The theory of corporate liberalism offered young radical scholars of the 1960s a new research 
program to explore neglected topics such as business political mobilisation and cast new light on 
topics considered exhausted such as American socialism. Liberals in the 1950s dismissed American 
socialism as doomed to failure but the new left argued it had been defeated only by a combination 
of state repression and skilful cooption implemented by ‘corporate liberals’.26 
To the new left historians the National Civic Federation (NCF) formed in 1900 exemplified corporate 
liberalism. The NCF united business leaders, selected unionists and public intellectuals behind a 
program of class cooperation and repudiation of the Smithian economy. It supported industrial 
mediation, conservative trade unionism, and Sherman Act amendment to permit agreements 
in reasonable restraint of competition to alleviate the problem of ruinous competition. The NCF 
was aware of the unpopularity of any proposal to weaken the Sherman Act and sought to divide 
the populist constituency by offering unions a very limited exemption from the Act. The fate of 
the NCF’s proposals demonstrated the limits of ‘corporate liberalism’. In 1907 Congress rejected 
proposed amendment of the Sherman Act to allow agreements in reasonable restraint of trade and 
grant limited exemptions from the Act to trade unions and producer organisations. Small business 
supported the Act as an anti-union tool. Democrats opposed the bill on populist grounds and were 
probably more representative of working-class opinion than those union leaders who argued that 
free competition was obsolete and that collective bargaining rather than self-employment was now 
the workers’ only option for industrial citizenship. Despite the Republican hegemony public opinion 
continued to have a significant impact on policy formation.27 
In the four years after 1908 the Republicans were rent by a bitter struggle between the party 
mainstream and progressive insurgents. The dispute reflected the doubts that many Republican 
voters felt about corporate capitalism but also the suspicion that they felt of a Democratic party 
tainted by populism and disloyalty and which forced them to express their doubts within the 
Republicans. After four Presidential victories the Republican old guard felt little need to conciliate 
public opinion. In 1912 the Republicans split and Roosevelt contested the election as candidate 
of a newly formed Progressive Party. Incumbent Republican president William Taft polled only 
23.2% compared to 27.4% for Roosevelt. Democrat Woodrow Wilson won with 41.8% and Socialist 
Eugene Debs polled 6 %. To many later historians Roosevelt personified corporate liberalism, but 
his public support in 1912 did not reflect the appeal of a corporate liberal program. His appeal 
reflected personal charisma and his misleading image as a ‘trustbuster’ but most of all his appeal 
was to Republicans. Roosevelt appealed to the left in particular reformists represented by bodies 
such as the American Association for Labor Legislation who advocated a national welfare state. The 
Progressives’ platform ignored trade union demands, Roosevelt was unenthusiastic about his Party’s 
antitrust plank and his campaign was dogged by allegations that his administration had displayed 
favouritism to particular businesses.28 
Gabriel Kolko, The triumph of conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New York, NY.: 
Free Press, 1963); Bryan Caplan, “Kolko 40 Years Later,” http://www.mail-archive.com/armchair@gmu.edu/
msg03394.html. 
26 Daniel Bell, The end of ideology: On the exhaustion of political ideas (New York: Free Press; Collier-Macmillan, 
1965); James Weinstein, The Decline of American Socialism, 1912-1925 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1967).
27 Sanders, Roots of reform., 92-93, 277; Freyer, Regulating big business., 9, 112; Mink, Old labor; Lamoreaux, 
Merger movement., 169-173; Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (Philadelphia, PA.: Porcupine 
Press, 1979).
28 Progressive Party, “Declaration of Principles of the Progressive Party,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/
presidents/26_t_roosevelt/psources/ps_trprogress.htm; Theda Skocpol, Protecting soldiers and mothers: the 
political origins of social policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995)., 176-204; 
G. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1946)., 189-
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The Progressives’ problem was that the electoral base of the American left was populist, not statist 
in its sympathies. Even the Socialists drew their support mostly from the rural periphery rather 
than the industrial north. The distribution of party support from 1908 to 1912 suggests that the 
Socialists stood in a similar relation to the Democrats as the Progressives to the Republicans. Most 
1912 Progressives were Republican identifiers, especially Roosevelt himself, at the 1916 Presidential 
election they returned to the reunited Republicans who lost the election 46.1% to 49.2%. Those 
Progressives on the left who rallied to Wilson in 1916 were a small group of statist intellectuals and 
western votes.29 
Some analysts have attributed the split in the Republican Party and the Democrats’ victory in 1912 
either to a general leftward shift of public opinion or estrangement of particular groups from 
the Republicans such as Midwestern farmers or the growing urban middle-class.30 There is little 
evidence for this. The erosion of support for the Republicans was fairly uniform. The geographical 
distribution of the Democratic vote was fairly stable from 1896 to 1916 particularly if the Socialist 
vote is counted with the Democrats and the combined Republican and progressive vote in 1912 
closely matched the 1908 Republican vote.
tAble 2: PeArson correlAtIon non-southern democrAtIc And 
socIAlIst votes by stAte 1892-1916 
1916 Democrats 1916 Democrats + Socialists
1892 Democrats 0.45 -0.30
1896 Democrats 0.77 0.86
tAble 3: PeArson correlAtIon non-southern democrAtIc, 
rePublIcAn And ProgressIve votes by stAte 1908-1912 
1912 
Democrats
1912 
Democrats + 
Socialists
1912 
Republicans
1912 
Progressives
1912 
Republicans 
+ 
Progressives
1908 
Democrats
.79 .85 -.40 -.29 -.82
1908 
Democrats + 
Socialists
67 91 -.40 -.89 -.89
1908 
Republicans
-.66 -.90 .44 .25 .88
The Republican crisis cannot be attributed to the rise of the urban middle-class; this group 
remained a small portion of the electorate. From 1890 to 1910 the portion of the male workforce 
in ‘professional services’ only rose from 2.9% to 3.3%, and in clerical work increased from 2% to 
3.8%. These shifts were irrelevant compared to the rise of industry and decline of agriculture. From 
1890 to 1910 the portion of the male workforce in agriculture fell from 47.3% to 34.8%. The portion 
29 David Sarasohn, “The Election of 1916: Realigning the Rockies,” Western Historical Quarterly 11, no. 3 (1980)., 
285-305 Sklar, American Capitalism., 34-36, 350; Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement., 
197. 
30 Cochran and Miller, Age of enterprise: , 293., 274-75; Horwitz, Transformation of American law., 224; Ray 
Teixeria and John Haplin, The Progressive Tradition in American Politics (Washington, DC.: Center for American 
Progress, 2010)., 10 
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of male workers in manufacturing rose from 23.2% to 29.5%. Workers in manufacturing found 
that corporate concentration weakened unionism and empowered managers to reduce workers’ 
autonomy in the labour process.31 The rise of the new capitalism concerned voters across the social 
spectrum, but voters, particularly those who were employed rather than self-employed, feared 
the impact of anti-corporate reforms on economic growth. The cultural appeal of the producers’ 
republic competed with party identification forged during 1860-77 and the appeal of tariff 
protection as nation-building tool. 
The Democrats’ ability to win 1912 and 1916 was also a result of their own political repositioning. 
In the 1890s Populists and Bryanite Democrats dismissed corporations as artificial constructions 
based on political favouritism opposed to the productive rural classes. Defenders of the new 
order, such as Roosevelt, instead argued that the growth of large corporations was a response to 
economic necessity. Wilson’s argument was intermediate, influenced by leading progressive lawyer 
Louis Brandeis; he celebrated economic progress but argued that although the growth of large 
corporations was in part desirable many corporations had as a result of financial manipulation 
expanded beyond the size were they could be effectively managed. In his appeal to workers Wilson 
argued that Roosevelt offered only paternalistic statist regulation that would undercut workers 
bargaining rights. Wilson’s approach was not that different from that which Bryan had reached by 
1912 but in the eyes of swinging voters Bryan remained the man of 1896.32
Both Roosevelt and Wilson believed that capitalism should remain a system of individual 
entrepreneurs. Roosevelt’s view of history reflected a faith in the creative power of individuals 
such as himself. He was more optimistic about the ability of individuals to lead giant corporations 
than was Wilson. During this period most large enterprises remained dominated by charismatic 
individuals rather than corporate bureaucracies. Individual entrepreneurs and their families often 
continued to hold a majority of stock and paid little attention to strategic planning or long-term 
allocation of resources. The academic champions of the giant corporations generalized from the 
successful reconstruction of individual production sites to argue that competition was wasteful. This 
perspective reflected a focus on cost-minimization rather than marketing or product innovation, 
as steel master Andrew Carnegie said ‘Watch the costs and the profits will take care of themselves’. 
‘Scientific management’ with its focus on increasing the productivity of individual workers was 
congruent with this approach. 33In future decades liberals would frequently counterpoise technical 
expertise in production to external forces such as financial markets or generalist and complacent 
managers. Liberals were often reluctant to admit that management could be a generic skill and that 
effective marketing could underpin business success.
Historical analysts of the new capitalism also grappled with the question of whether mergers were 
efficient, the work of industrial statesmen, or a device for market control by ‘robber barons’. From 
the 1960s Alfred Chandler’s analysis sought to transcend this dichotomy. He agreed that many early 
mergers sought production control rather than greater efficiency, but argued that long run success 
31 David Brody, Steelworkers in America: the Nonunion Era (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1960); 
Edwards, Occupational Statistics., 104; David F Noble, America by design: Science, technology, and the rise of 
corporate capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
32 Populist Party, “Platform of the Populist Party,” http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.
asp?document=963; Bryan, “Cross of Gold”; L. Brandeis, “The Regulation of Competition Versus the Regula-
tion of Monopoly,” http://www.law.louisville.edu.au/library/collections/brandeis/node/260; Woodrow 
Wilson, The new freedom: a call for the emancipation of the generous energies of a people (New York, NY: 
Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913)., 96-110; Sklar, American Capitalism., 417; Mark J Roe, Strong manag-
ers, weak owners: the political roots of American corporate finance (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 
1996)., 28-35; Bryan, “Problem of the Trusts“; “Danger to Democrats if Bryan Wins Fight,” New York Times, 25 
June 1912; Woodrow Wilson, “On Labor,” http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5723..
33 Theodore Roosevelt, “The Strenuous Life,” http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.
asp?document=608; Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American law., 325; Chandler, Visible Hand., 9, 104-105; 
Sklar, American Capitalism., 189-190; Freyer, Regulating big business., 38-39; Brody, Steelworkers in America., 2; 
Prechel, Big business., 99
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required real economies in production, distribution and marketing. More recent work, in response 
to the poor economic performance of many large Chandlerian firms since the 1970s, challenged 
Chandler to emphasize the extent to which corporate consolidation was influenced by fears of 
ruinous competition and has suggested that the giant corporations did create effective long-term 
barriers to entry.34 
After 1912 the Democrats controlled Congress and the Presidency but their grip on power was 
tenuous. The party had to harmonise the anti-corporate inclinations of its southern base, with the 
widespread belief among voters, especially working-class voters in the north east that their well-
being depended on the prosperity of the corporate capitalist economy. By 1912 it was clear that 
corporate capitalism was here to stay and had not led to the dystopia feared by populists, but it was 
also clear that it could survive the Sherman Act. The dystopia of chronic overproduction and excess 
capacity evoked by the theorists of ‘ruinous competition’ had not eventuated. To secure electoral 
success American liberalism had to come to terms with the viability of capitalism.
In 1914 the Democrats against strong Republican opposition passed legislation to establish the 
Federal Trade Commission to supplant Justice Department policing of competition law and the 
Clayton Act. The later extended antitrust law to target specific corporate actions and structures such 
as price discrimination and also sought to limit the constraint of unions by antitrust legislation. The 
1914 legislation was a response to the demise of the Smithian economy and focused on corporate 
misbehaviour rather than individual wrongdoing.35 
The reforms of the Wilson administration were more sympathetic to corporate capitalism than many 
of his 1912 voters probably hoped. The establishment of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1913 was a 
delayed response to the panic of 1907. Although most capitalists would have preferred a different 
model of central banking the Reserve was still far removed from the hopes of the Populists. The 
establishment of the Federal Reserve probably benefitted the Democrats electorally. The party in 
government had resolved a problem that had preoccupied policy makers for a long period. Wilson’s 
overall competence and effectiveness countered perceptions of the Democrats as extremist and 
incompetent. The 1912 Democratic Platform had in reference to the Standard Oil and American 
Tobacco decisions, deplored recent ‘judicial construction’ and called for restoration of the ‘strength’ of 
the Act, but the Clayton Act did not restore an absolute ban on ‘restraint of trade’. The 1914 reforms 
reflected a balance between popular anti-corporate sentiment among the Democratic base and 
the dependence of voters on economic growth. By 1914 the economy was in recession and at 
the Congressional elections of that year the Republicans criticised the Democrats’ policies of tariff 
reduction and antitrust reform. The Republicans made gains in the industrial north-east.36 
After 1914 the Democrats moved in part towards policies that resembled some aspects of 
Roosevelt’s statist progressivism of 1912 although their development of close ties to the union 
movements diverged from Roosevelt’s template. This shift was impelled by the needs of war 
preparedness and war participation after 1917. The Democrats also needed to develop a winning 
strategy for the 1916 election, after the 1914 election had suggested the limitations of a neo-
populist appeal. The government emphasised labour legislation, such as prohibitions on child 
labour and minimum hours for railroad workers together with support for farmers and this assisted 
it to rally a small but electorally crucial portion of 1912 Progressive (and Socialist) voters for a narrow 
victory in 1916. After American entry to the World War the antitrust laws were suspended and close 
34 Chandler, Visible Hand.-8, 200, 241, 299, 315-339; Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American law., 308-22; Lamor-
eaux, Merger movement., 7-10, 183-94.
35 Sanders, Roots of reform., 276-313; Freyer, Regulating big business., 110-120
36 “The Verdict of the Nation,” New York Times, 4 November 1914; Sanders, Roots of reform.,282-97, 361; “Wilson 
the Issue in Many States,” New York Times, 1 November 1914; Democratic Party, “1912 Democratic Party 
Platform,” http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29590.
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cooperation was established between business and government.37 These policies were rejected 
by voters and employers in the immediate aftermath of war. The Republicans won major victories 
at the 1918 Congressional and 1920 Presidential elections and employers mobilized against trade 
unions.
Throughout the 1920s Republicans won sweeping Presidential and Congressional victories. The 
Democrats were unhappily divided on economic policy between progressives and conservatives 
and on cultural issues, such as prohibition, between their Protestant southern base and north-
eastern ethnic workers. Conservative Democrats sought economic credibility by an attempt to 
recruit prominent businessmen to the party. The rightward drift of the Democrats evoked dissent 
on the left and in 1924 progressive Republican Robert La Follette contested the presidency as a 
Progressive in opposition to conservative Democrat John Davis and Republican Calvin Coolidge. 
Davis polled only 28.8% and La Follette 16.6% of the vote. As with Roosevelt in 1912 La Follete’s 
support was largely drawn from Republicans.38 
tAble 4: PeArson correlAtIon 1920 And 1924 PresIdentIAl votes 
non-southern stAtes 
1924 Democrats 1924 
Republicans
1924 
Progressives
1924 
Republicans + 
Progressives
1920 Democrats 0.89 -0.27 -0.58 -0.88
1920 
Republicans
-0.75 0.46 0.33 0.75
The ideological convergence of Republicans and Democrats reflected both the exhaustion of 
much of the old populist program after the reforms of 1914 and transformations within American 
capitalism that underpinned productivity growth and rising real wages. A renewed merger wave, 
largely horizontal, absorbed many smaller firms. Family capitalism declined and professional 
management became more important, and some enterprises diversified into related areas, but 
these enterprises remained centralized. Most adopted the ‘U-form’ of functional divisions under 
the control of an executive which comprised representatives of each division. Corporate managers 
placed trust in new accounting techniques to monitor the activities of different divisions.39 
The decline of family capitalism assuaged public concern about corporate power. Real wages rose 
in contrast to the pre-1912 period. Employers undertook a largely successful ‘open shop’ offensive 
against unions. Many unskilled workers welcomed the higher wages that mass production offered. 
American liberals found themselves politically isolated, some trusted in a ‘corporate liberalism’ and 
hoped that enlightened employers would maintain and extend wartime experiments in employee 
welfare and participation programs but employer interest in these initiatives declined steadily as the 
working-class challenge ebbed. The development of norms of cooperation between competitors 
in industries such as steel reduced pressure on costs and encouraged a more conciliatory labour 
37 Sanders, Roots of reform., 359-386; Kim McQuaid, “Corporate liberalism in the American business communi-
ty, 1920-1940,” Business History Review 52, no. 3 (1978)., 345; Joseph A McCartin, Labor’s great war: the struggle 
for industrial democracy and the origins of modern American labor relations, 1912-1921 (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the progressive era, 1910-1917 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1982)., 239-240.
38 Michael Webber, New Deal fat cats: business, labor, and campaign finance in the 1936 presidential election 
(New York, NY.: Fordham University Press, 2000)., 22-25; Douglas Craig, After Wilson: the struggle for the 
Democratic Party, 1920-1934 (Chapel Hill, NC.: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); N. McCarty, K. Poole, 
and H. Rosenthal, “Polarized America,” http://voteview.com/Polarized_America.htm. 
39 Chandler, Visible Hand., 39, 71, 111-20, 396-97, 473-74.
discovery
application
excellence 19
policy. Questions of antitrust policy largely disappeared from the political agenda and rated only a 
cursory mention even in La Follete’s 1924 campaign.40
With the Democrats divided and marginalised the Republicans moved cautiously to revive aspects 
of Roosevelt’s corporatism. Herbert Hoover Secretary of Commerce 1921 to 1928 and President 
from 1928 encouraged what he called ‘associationism’; business cooperation through trade 
associations. A hostile public response squashed post-war suggestions from business for reform of 
the antitrust laws but the judiciary was less constrained by public opinion. Decisions such as that of 
the Supreme Court in 1920 in US Steel suggested that only a complete monopoly would be held to 
violate the Sherman Act.41
The conservative ascendancy of the 1920s is evidence against the contention of the ‘corporate 
liberal’ school that only a party of the left could stabilise corporate capitalism. Their response was to 
redefine Hoover as a liberal, and here they drew on later libertarian right critics of ‘associationism’. 
The new left also emphasised the supposed commitment of ‘big business’ to liberal reforms but 
failed to demonstrate that such liberal businessmen represented more than an aberrant minority.42
capitalist crisis and recovery
The Great Depression demonstrated that rise of managerial capitalism did not guarantee 
against economic crisis. The spectre of ruinous competition and ‘over-production’ preoccupied 
policymakers and so severe was the crisis that even many liberals briefly supported cartelisation 
during the first years of the New Deal. 
In 1933 legislation established the National Recovery Administration (NRA) that provided exemption 
from antitrust statutes to firms that cooperated in the maintenance of price levels and wages. The 
obverse of popular concern with ‘over-production’ was anxiety about ‘under-consumption’ and 
the Act also supported collective bargaining between employers and unions with the hope of 
increasing wages and consumption. The Act revived the themes of the NCF and was briefly backed 
by some progressive businessmen, but if it was a victory for corporate liberalism it proved short-
lived. Even sympathetic capitalists were soon critical of growing union assertiveness and increases 
in government spending. Many concluded that even if ruinous completion was a serious problem 
an appeal to government posed more dangers. The business backlash against regulation was 
not unanimous. In some industries such as coal and interstate transport capitalists, often with the 
support of workers, were able to appeal to values of resource conservation and public safety to 
support the development of durable regulatory structures that would endure until the 1970s.43 
40 Arthur Krock, “Sham and Real Platform Planks Against Monopoly,” New York Times, 8 July 1936; Hounsell, 
American System., 257-259; Louis Galambos, “The Agrarian Image of the Large Corporation, 1879-1920: A 
Study in Social Accommodation,” The Journal of Economic History 28, no. 3 (1968); McQuaid, “Corporate liber-
alism.”, 348-52; “La Follette’s Platform,” New York Times, 6 July 1924..
41 Leonard DeGraaf, “Corporate Liberalism and Electric Power System Planning in the 1920s,” Business History 
Review 64, no. 1 (1990)., 28-32; Freyer, Regulating big business., 68-71, 168-169; Cochran and Miller, Age of 
enterprise., 304-05; Horwitz, Transformation of American law., 207; Brody, Steelworkers in America., 147-179 
42 Martin J. Sklar, “Some political and cultural consequences of the disaccumulation of capital: origins of 
postindustrial development in the 1920s,” in The United States as a developing country: Studies in U.S. History 
in the Progressive Era and the 1920s, ed. Martin J. Sklar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)., 169-
170; William A. Williams, The Contours of American History (London: Jonathan Cape, 1961)., 425-438; Murray 
N. Rothbard, “The Hoover Myth [1966],” in For a New America: Essays in History and Politics from Studies on the 
Left, 1959-1967, ed. James Weinstein and David W. Eakins (New York, NY.: Vintage Books, 1970)., 163-179
43 D. Brand, “Competition and the New Deal Regulatory State,” in The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism, 
ed. S. Milkis and J. Mileur (Amherst, MA.: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002)., 174-178; Sklar, “Disaccu-
mulation of capital.”, 164-166; McQuaid, “Corporate liberalism.”, 357-362; Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Politics of 
Upheaval (Boston, MA.: Houghton Mifflin, 1960)., 263-290; Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the problem of 
monopoly: A study in economic ambivalence (New York, NY.: Fordham University Press, 1995)., 167, 205-246. 
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
20 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
In 1935 the Supreme Court ruled the NRA unconstitutional and in 1936 both Republican and 
Democratic platforms condemned private monopoly. In retrospect the NRA was an aberrant 
product of crisis. Intellectual support for the NRA came from a distinct milieu of advocates of 
business self-regulation who looked back to Theodore Roosevelt’s progressivism, but by the 1930s 
critics of unrestrained capitalism were now more likely to espouse national economic planning 
under government direction than business self-regulation. Among the broader electorate populist 
suspicion of large-scale capitalism remained strong even as the NRA remained in place Congress 
supported legislation more in accordance with the populist tradition directed against holding 
companies and investment banking and for protection of small local banks.44 
The revival of the populist tradition accelerated after the 1936 election and the onset of a 
severe recession in 1937. In part this reflected the natural political propensity of a Democratic 
majority once the immediate crisis of 1932-33 had passed but changed academic and political 
understandings of the impact of oligopoly were also significant. In 1937 antitrust law enforcement 
was rejuvenated by the appointment of Thurman Arnold as Assistant Attorney-General for 
antitrust and Congress established the Temporary National Economic Committee to investigate 
monopolisation. President Roosevelt revived the rhetoric of Wilson to argue that the greater 
efficiency of mass applied only to individual plants and that ‘managed industrial processes reduced 
output and employment and that excessive business power threatened fascism.45
The revival of a more assertive approach to antitrust also reflected broader intellectual and political 
shifts. By the late 1930s the American left had rallied to the New Deal, independent socialist politics 
had collapsed and the Communist Party was committed to support of Roosevelt. The corporatist 
vision was discredited by the failure of the NRA and the example of European fascism which the 
left blamed on monopoly capital. New theories of imperfect competition undercut fears of ruinous 
competition and economic collapse and instead argued that oligopolistic corporations might reach 
a market equilibrium characterised by excess capacity and excessive expenditures on advertising.46 
Academic models of imperfect competition had more impact on intellectuals and executive 
policy-makers than on Congress whose members remained preoccupied by the decentralization of 
economic power rather than consumer welfare. Congress supported protection for local businesses 
against chain stores despite higher costs to consumers. Nevertheless populist and elite support of 
competition converged and this meant policy success whereas popular and elite understandings 
of budgetary policy diverged and voters remained hostile to deficit budgeting. It is a pattern that 
would repeat itself in recent years when popular opinion on the left was preoccupied by perceived 
corporate wrongdoing, such as outsourcing, rather than budgetary policy. 47 
In the long-run all of these developments in policy and politics would have counted for little if 
American capitalism had not successfully responded to the economic crisis and thus undercut 
advocates of a planned economy whether of a socialist or corporatist form. Despite the severity 
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of the Depression innovations in management laid the foundation for later post-war prosperity. 
The most significant responses were the rise of multidivisional firms and oligopolistic competition; 
the former would underpin long-run increases in productivity and the later ended the problem of 
ruinous competition. Both reflected the outcome of political struggles; within enterprises and in 
the development of the relations between enterprises. These reforms enabled the Democrats as 
a party of the left to coexist with a corporate capitalism that could generate sustainable increases 
in living standards for the left’s electoral base. At the same time the Democrats reconfigured their 
cultural appeal away from southern populism by their endorsement of northern liberal presidential 
candidates in 1928 and 1932.48 
The rapid recovery of the economy from its low point in 1932 bolstered popular support for the 
Democrats. Had this recovery not occurred Franklin Roosevelt would probably have been a one-
term President and the New Deal judged a failure. The basis of the Democratic coalition changed 
significantly in this period. By 1940 the Democrats’ non-southern support was much more based 
in the industrial north-east than it had been in the Wilson era. Outside of the south the Pearson 
correlation by states between 1916 Democratic and Socialist votes and the 1940 Democratic  
vote was 0.43 whereas from the 1896 Democratic vote to the 1916 Democratic and Socialist vote  
it was 0.86.49
In the interwar period many major American corporations, beginning with Du Pont and General 
Motors, moved away from the highly centralised unitary structure (or in some cases away from a 
decentralised holding company structure) towards the multidivisional model, or M-form. In this 
model production was decentralised to profit centres while a central office retained oversight of 
strategic planning, and some aspects of production were outsourced. The rise of the multidivisional 
structure was the result of sustained political struggle within the firm by innovators against 
established managers who argued that the solution to poor performance was merely better 
information collection. The archetypal U-form crisis was often an inventory crisis as divisions, 
undisciplined by the market, accumulated stock despite falling demand. The executive of the 
M-form was not to comprise representatives of divisions; rather they were to act in the interests 
of the corporation as whole and transactions between divisions were supposed to be at market 
prices.50 
Many later radical analysts of the Great Depression employed Antonio Gramsci’s concept of 
‘Fordism’. To them the development of mass production, exemplified by the assembly line, was the 
essence of contemporary capitalism. They attributed the Great Depression to production having 
run ahead of consumption, but this assumed that large corporations exercised hegemony over 
consumption choices and that consumption was a passive function of wage levels. In fact the first 
unitary enterprises to fall into crisis were those that sold to individual consumers. The effectiveness 
of the multidivisional structure was a function of the diversity of output rather than firm size. The 
ideal of market competition between divisions in the multidivisional structure paralleled Oscar 
Lange’s contemporaneous model of market socialism under which state-owned enterprises were 
to act as though they were in a competitive market. The multidivisional enterprise enabled product 
diversity and stabilized oligopolistic competition and ended the spectre of ruinous competition 
and boosted consumption. Theorists of corporate liberalism argued that only the state could act 
in the collective interests of capital but oligopolistic competition demonstrated that firms could 
develop norms of cooperation that overcame opportunism. In these respect socialist aspects, 
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or what more might meaningfully be described as ‘liberal’ in the contemporary American sense, 
elements emerged within capitalism, as Martin Sklar argues. An oligopolistic capitalism based on 
multidivisional enterprises demonstrated the acceptance by capitalists of aspects of the socialist 
critique. 51 
The story of American capitalism during the interwar years is one of crisis and recovery, but later 
radical analysts instead focused on the engagement between business and the New Deal. Some 
argued that ‘fractions’ of capital had distinct interests that led them to adopt a ‘corporate liberal’ 
position and support New Deal policies of deficit budgeting and increased consumer purchasing 
power. There is little evidence to support this model, business support for New Deal Democrats 
was very limited and what there was reflected regional and ethnic alignments and regulatory 
concerns: Jews, southerners and a liquor industry grateful for the end of prohibition. The more 
integrated individual capitalists were into established corporate networks the more likely they were 
to contribute to the Republicans. Congressional Republicans moved leftward during this period but 
this reflected not the influence of corporate liberalism but the scale of public distress and electoral 
expediency.52 
liberalism and capitalism resurgent
After liberalism became the object of radical obloquy from the 1960s some later historians would 
often identify the years of World War II as an ‘end to reform’, in which the radical promise of the 
New Deal ebbed, and capitalism regained the esteem it had lost during the Depression. These 
critics looked back both to the planners of the early New Deal and those radicals of the mid 1930s 
who advocated the creation of an independent left-wing party. It is true that proposals for a 
legislated guarantee of full employment and the extension of wartime economic planning failed 
in an increasingly conservative Congress. Yet this pessimistic evaluation of the New Deal was not 
shared by most contemporary liberals of whom many saw the increased role of government in the 
war economy as presaging fundamental shift in the American political economy towards a non-
capitalist future. Union membership soared during the war and income inequality fell markedly and 
these gains were preserved despite the Republican political upsurge of the early 1950.53 
Liberals of the 1950s sometimes judged American capitalism by the standards of an imagined 
past world of individual entrepreneurs, and the extent which decentralisation had transformed 
the structure of the giant corporations was neglected. Many were influenced by the conservative 
Joseph Schumpeter who inverted Marxism to argue that the bureaucratization of large-scale 
corporations presaged a shift towards socialism, but liberals considered that socialism was perhaps 
now as obsolete a concept as capitalism. Some liberals believed the United States would evolve 
towards a post-capitalist post-industrial future in which the old middle class became ‘organization 
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men’. Even those observers who recognized the spread of multidivisional enterprises interpreted 
this innovation as an administrative convenience rather than one which laid the foundation for a 
renewed emphasis on profitability.54 
Liberal intellectual enquiry was significantly influenced by the academic discovery of the work 
of Max Weber and the threat of Communism. To liberals Weber offered a non-Marxist theory of 
modernity that recognised the inevitability of hierarchy and bureaucracy whether public or private. 
The Soviet experience apparently demonstrated that modernity required the accumulation of 
capital, whether by commissars or robber barons, at the expense of present living standards, until 
a point of ‘take-off’ was reached. The influence of Weber together with the brief rise of advertising 
and marketing personnel to corporate leadership inspired a focus on the values and character 
formation of the men of the new capitalism. The experiences of Stalinism and McCarthyism 
rendered liberals suspicious of populism and simplistic anti-capitalism. Liberal intellectuals now 
emphasised the xenophobic and insular nature of the old populism and many considered Theodore 
Roosevelt’s scepticism about antitrust as more relevant to contemporary politics. In the 1930s 
liberals had looked to insurgent farmers and workers to tame capitalism but now they celebrated 
the ‘countervailing power’ of pressure groups. 55 
The doubts of liberal intellectuals had limited impact on political liberalism where the antitrust 
critique of corporate power remained influential. Fin-de-siècle economists had once been sceptical 
of antitrust law but theories of imperfect competition now suggested that oligopolistic competition 
would display many of the undesirable features of monopoly. The American government 
campaigned for the introduction of antitrust to defeated Germany and Japan. The senior judiciary 
had by the mid 1940s caught up with the more aggressive antitrust policy initiated by the executive 
in the late 1930s.56 
The Democrats lost the presidential elections of 1952 and 1956 but remained the dominant party 
in Congress. Senior Democrats mostly represented the south and west where populist traditions 
remained strong. President Dwight Eisenhower’s Republican administration strongly enforced 
antitrust laws. However Democrats complained large corporations had now become so dominant 
that they no longer needed to engage in illegal conduct such as predatory pricing and that 
legislation should be amended as a consequence. A 1951 survey found most Americans agreed that 
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the good outweighed the bad about big business, although concern persisted about the prospects 
of small business.57 
The populist tradition secured a legislative victory with 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act which 
strengthened existing prohibitions on anti-competitive mergers. The new Act encouraged the rise 
of multi-industry conglomerates as entrepreneurs sought to diversify outside of their home industry 
to escape antitrust scrutiny. These diversified enterprises usually employed the multidivisional 
form and thus laid the foundation for a shift of power back to shareholders as conglomerate 
managements had to compare rates of return across divisions. The New Deal suspicion of finance 
capital persisted; 1956 legislation restricted further the ability of banks to diversify.58 
The liberal political consensus about antitrust was vulnerable to two criticisms. From the left it was 
argued that despite an active antitrust program the economy remained dominated by oligopolies. 
Libertarian critics of antitrust remained marginal but the remarkable post-war economic prosperity 
challenged arguments for negative economic impact of oligopoly. In the Alcoa case of 1945 Second 
Circuit Court Judge Learned Hand, once a candidate for Roosevelt’s Progressives, upheld a finding 
of monopolization against Alcoa. Hand commented that a basic motive of the antitrust statutes was 
to uphold competition ‘for its own sake and in spite of possible cost’. These anomalies would plunge 
the liberal antitrust program into crisis from the late 1960s as established economic theories came 
under challenge and policymakers placed greater emphasis on economic costs.59
corporate liberalism triumphant?
One reason for the rise of the theory of ‘corporate liberalism’ during the 1960s was that the 
broader political economy seemed to verify the theory. There was a renewed great merger wave. 
Corporations applied their excess managerial capacity to diversify into unrelated areas where small 
enterprises had previously been dominant. This process was widely seen as anticompetitive by 
observers who failed to consider that conglomerate enterprises were multidivisional.60
On another level the development of conglomerates mirrored that of political parties. 
Conglomerates claimed to be solely concerned with profitability rather than the production of 
particular goods or services. This mirrored the cold-war liberalism’s redefinition of democracy as a 
contest between elites for office rather than as a battle of ideas or war between classes.
The Democrats in office from 1960 under Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson moved 
closer towards a rapprochement with large scale business, particularly after Kennedy adopted a 
conservative Keynesian policy of tax reductions to boost the economy. The Democrats benefitted 
by the Republicans brief move to the radical right under Barry Goldwater. The support of liberal 
Democrats for the Vietnam War, their apparent electoral ascendancy and their pursuit of alliances 
with business bolstered the ‘corporate liberalism’ hypothesis. Critics complained that formerly 
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dissident groups such as workers were incorporated in the liberal consensus. To new left radicals the 
victims of ‘monopoly capital’ were mostly outside the United States.61
The merger wave attracted suspicion among the antitrust community and within Congress. In 1967 
President Johnson commissioned a major inquiry on antitrust led by law Professor Philip Neal. The 
President may have hoped for a renewed populist appeal to traditional Democrats trending to the 
right on issues of race and public order. The inquiry report in 1968 criticised the merger wave and 
recommended new legislation to tackle oligopolies. It declared that antitrust reflected not just 
concerns for consumer welfare but also ‘a preference for private decision making; a major value of 
competition is that it minimizes the necessity for direct government intervention in the economy’.62 
Antitrust was championed by the liberal Supreme Court majority whose rulings struck down 
mergers that only slightly increased market concentration. These were the glory days of legal 
liberalism in which the Supreme Court largely escaped the scorn of liberalism’s radical critics. 
Anti-business sentiment also increased among the broader public and Congressional Democrats 
encouraged by rising inflation and a broader culture of scepticism towards established institutions. 
Republican Richard Nixon elected in 1968 was reluctant to challenge this mood. He commissioned 
another review of antitrust law that rejected Neal’s recommendations but he believed that an 
active antirust policy, including pursuit of conglomerates, together with acceptance of regulatory 
initiatives from a Democratic Congress aided his appeal to socially conservative but economically 
liberal white blue-collar workers.63
Academic liberalism reflected the broader mood. Charles Lindblom and Robert Dahl, once 
defenders of American democracy against its radical critics, now argued that the subordination 
of workers to capitalist authority and the dependence of democratic governments upon the 
confidence of capitalist investors undercut liberal democracy. The emphasis on inherent human 
rights by sixties radicals and liberals challenged older progressive traditions formed in the battle 
against judicial conservatism which considered the idea of natural rights a tool of conservative 
resistance.64 
Further to the left radical economists challenged the argument that hierarchy was necessary for 
efficiency. Labor process theorists argued that capitalism required dehumanising structures of 
domination to convert labour-power into labour. Rising levels of strike action, absenteeism and 
labour turnover in large industrial enterprises inspired a multitude of commentary on the ‘blue 
collar blues’.65
In 1976 the Democrats regained the Presidency with Jimmy Carter. There was a brief period in 
which as in the 1930s radically statist measures were on the agenda. Some Keynesian economists 
and liberal politicians proposed national economic planning on the French model. The 1973 
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oil shock led to shortages and rising prices and made the big oil companies deeply unpopular. 
Traditional anti-corporate populism revived and in 1976 Congress considered legislation to break 
up the large integrated oil companies. National planning and oil company disaggregation remained 
a liberal dream but the 1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act required that advance notice of corporate 
mergers above a certain value be given to authorities and enabled states to sue on behalf of their 
citizens for antitrust damages.66 
In the late 1970s Marxists and liberal historians predicted a shift towards corporatism and a 
politicization of capital accumulation. The New York City fiscal crisis of 1975 led to the formation of 
an emergency financial agency with authority over the city’s budget. The agency was dominated 
by business representatives but with limited labour participation. The experience inspired calls for a 
similar cooperation at a national level. Liberal analysts of economic policy often dismissed antitrust 
laws as irrelevant.67
The radical critique of corporate hierarchy that emerged in the late 1960s impelled those 
who defended its necessity to sharpen their argument. Two different responses emerged. 
Alfred Chandler’s 1977 The Visible Hand revived the themes of 1950s liberalism and provided 
a sophisticated defence of corporate hierarchy as necessary to secure economies of scale in 
production, distribution and marketing, Chandler’s work inspired some scholars to identify an 
‘organizational revolution’, apparent in the rise of professional bureaucracies not in business but also 
in government and even in non-government organizations such as trade unions. The ‘organizational 
revolution’ school took up some of the themes of ‘corporate liberal’ theory but Chandler viewed 
American society more favourably. Despite this even he reflected the mood of the times when 
he observed that a ‘critical issue of modern times’ was ‘how narrowly trained managers who must 
administer the processes of distribution and production in complex modern economies, can be 
made responsible for their actions – actions that have far reaching consequences’.68
From the 1970s a new challenge to populist antitrust emerged further to the right in the form of 
transaction cost economics or the ‘new institutionalism’. The members of this school such as Robert 
Bork and Richard Posner argued that the focus of antitrust should be on consumer welfare rather 
than the preservation of competition for its own sake. They drew on transaction cost economics 
to argue that many practices viewed with suspicion by antitrust such as vertical integration were 
a rational response to the difficulties that opportunism imposed for orthodox contracting. Their 
critique of antitrust was a major blow against established liberalism but the Chicago School also 
challenged liberalism’s radical critics. Transaction cost analysts argued that the subordination 
of workers to capitalist authority was a rational response to the requirements of production 
coordination. They contended that authority was essential for the coordination of any complex 
productive process that required large numbers of workers. Without such authority individual 
workers would ‘shirk’ their share of labour on the expectation that other workers would take up the 
slack.69
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The new institutionalists argued that liberal assumptions had conservative implications, in a 
world of imperfect information and opportunism, hierarchy was sometimes the best possible 
outcome. Their arguments mirrored a broader disenchantment with 1960s liberalism among 
many intellectuals and Democratic politicians. The new institutionalists found common ground 
on policy with libertarian critics of antitrust, even although their utilitarianism diverged from the 
libertarian preoccupation with natural rights. They criticized the ‘old institutionalism’ of Thorstein 
Veblen for its hostility to neo-classical economics and interventionist sympathies.70 In style the 
new institutionalists recalled the business intellectuals of the early twentieth-century, such as the 
NCF, with their dismissal of Smithian shibboleths and natural rights and endorsement of corporate 
hierarchy.
The impact of the Chicago critique of antitrust on policy was rapid during the early 1970s. 
Government agencies and the judiciary shifted their approach to emphasise efficiency and 
consumer welfare. They no longer assumed that mergers automatically reduced competition. The 
focus of competition policy turned towards deregulation of industries such as telephony and road 
transport where arguments about ruinous competition and natural monopolies had previously 
been employed to justify regulation. At a time of high inflation many liberals and consumer activists 
argued that deregulation would reduce prices and increase consumer welfare. Unions’ fears for 
employment conditions and job security were largely ignored.71 
Political liberals had to respond to the rightward drift of public opinion, as faith in government 
plunged to record lows and the public became notably more sympathetic to business corporations, 
although not to the level of the 1950s. Many voters blamed governments and unions for rising 
prices and the Carter administration came to focus on inflation rather than unemployment. It 
experimented with corporatist policies but eventually adopted a tight monetary policy which 
increased interest rates and unemployment and alienated working-class voters.72 
The rightward shift of public opinion was initially driven by inflation but it was changing levels of 
productivity growth that had the most significant long-term impact political impact. From about 
1973 the rate of productivity growth halved, and although the increased entry of women into the 
paid workforce cushioned the effect on overall economic growth the result was for Americans a 
long period of public resentment.73 
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capitalism over liberalism
In the 1980 Presidential elections business support for Republican candidate Ronald Reagan 
was conspicuously high. Reagan’s political origins lay in the insurgent right of the 1960s but his 
strongest backing among business came from its educated elite, and as in the 1930s Democratic 
support among business was disproportionately drawn from Jews and southerners.74 
The Reagan administration’s antitrust policy reflected the influence of both the Chicago School 
and traditional libertarians. It sought to restrict antitrust enforcement to criminal prosecutions 
of collusive tendering and cartels rather than to monitor mergers. However as before 1912 the 
conservative political ascendancy coexisted with public support for antitrust. In 1986 Congress 
rejected administration proposals to weaken the Clayton Act. The states, in particular those with 
Democratic administrations, became more assertive in antitrust.75
The post-war liberal consensus had reflected a broader economic stability. In the fifty years from 
1917 to 1967 only 14 out of the 278 largest companies in 1917 had been liquidated, dissolved 
or discontinued. This stability came to a dramatic end in the 1970s and 1980s. Many classic 
Chandlerian corporations that had diversified during the merger wave of the 1960s were broken 
up during the 1980s. Corporate raiders or sometimes sections of management borrowed vast 
sums often from fringe operators such as ‘junk-bond’ merchants to finance buyouts. The central 
management of many multidivisional conglomerates had struggled to effectively monitor the 
affairs of their diverse divisions and share and financial markets now favoured disaggregation. The 
distinction between operational activities (the responsibility of the divisions) and entrepreneurial 
activities (responsibility of the executive) proved unsustainable like the market socialist division 
between markets in the present and planning for the future. Those conglomerates that survived 
adapted by the increased linkage of managerial remuneration to share prices.76 
The massive levels of debt that financed these buyouts were defended by their promoters as a 
necessary spur to more efficient operation. This contention reversed the argument of Thorstein 
Veblen eighty years earlier that high fixed costs such as debt led managers to limit output and 
inflate prices. Veblen inspired later liberals to argue that complacent corporate bureaucrats, 
conglomerate empire builders and much of the finance sector stood in the way of a productive 
economy. Critics of the buyout wave revived Veblen’s arguments and argued that the takeover 
wave represented an unproductive ‘paper entrepreneurialism’ at the expense of working-class living 
standards.77
Many economists interpreted conglomerate breakups as a triumph of the market; even although 
earlier some had defended conglomerates as an efficient use of excess managerial capacity, 
and suggested that managerial labour markets could overcome problems of the separation of 
ownership and control.78 
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Among the Democrats their 1980 defeat sparked much reconsideration. The severity of the early 
1980s recession and the perceived failure of Keynesian economics during the 1970s briefly sparked 
a revival of interest in ‘industrial policy’ and ‘reindustrialisation’. The proponents of industrial policy 
drew support particularly from policy entrepreneurs and business journalists. They argued that 
the shift from ‘smokestack’ into new high technology industries should be facilitated by access to 
finance for enterprise start-ups, greater investment in infrastructure and education, together with 
retraining programs to ease the pain of structural adjustment and reduce protectionist pressures. 
Among the public the decline of industrial America under the pressures of foreign competition 
(aggravated by a soaring US dollar) and high interest generated an outpouring of nostalgia for the 
glory days of the New deal settlement in the works of artists such as Bruce Springsteen.79
Business sympathy for industrial policy reflected both the severity of the early 1980s recession but 
also concern about government budgetary and national trade deficits. Some on the political left 
believed that the industry policy debate foreshowed a likely corporatist turn under a Democratic 
administration, but business interest ebbed as the economy recovered, even although many 
capitalists remained concerned about the federal budget deficit.80 
Many liberals responded to the new conservative ascendancy by a call for the left to refocus 
on economic inequality rather cultural conflicts. Liberals revisited American history in a more 
sympathetic light than the post-war liberals and the new left. As the 1980s became a new gilded 
age of excess, the Populists were no longer dismissed by liberals as exponents of a xenophobic 
nostalgia. Liberal historians praised progressives for their commitment to economic regulation, 
despite their racism, imperialism and wartime suppression of radical dissent. This turn to history 
was part of broader pattern; many legal liberals argued that the American Revolution was less the 
product of Lockean individualism than communitarian ‘republicanism’.81 
The conservative ascendancy posed a challenge for the theory of ‘corporate liberalism’. Corporations 
were more powerful but liberalism was on the retreat. Liberal critics had also accused the theorists 
of ‘corporate liberalism’ of a highly selective use of evidence. Martin Sklar did his best to defend the 
theory. His 1988 The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism downplayed the emphasis 
of early corporate liberal theory on the conscious agency of state elites to focus on the extent to 
which the consolidation of corporate capitalism during 1890-1912 represented the triumph of a 
social movement, which linked entrepreneurs, financers, politicians and intellectuals in a particular 
historical project. Yet having formulated this proposition Sklar failed to extend this insight into an 
analysis of the internal operations of large-scale corporations. If the survival of capitalism was due 
to its ability to incorporate elements of socialism then this balance changed substantially over 
time. Sklar’s own interpretation of contemporary American capitalism jumbled together state 
regulation and corporate organisation. In large part he repeated 1950s liberal assertions of the 
decline of capitalism and the inevitability of the ‘mixed economy’. The revolutionary transformations 
in American capitalism since the 1970s passed unnoticed, and this neglect underpinned Sklar’s own 
drift towards neo-conservatism. The thesis of ‘corporate liberalism’ would continue to be echoed 
by critics of American liberalism from the left who sought to trace the malaise of early twenty-first 
century liberalism to the compromises made by early twentieth-century liberals.82 
79 George Eads et al., “The political realities of industrial policy,” Harvard Business Review 61, no. 5 (1983)., 81; 
Robert Reich, “Why the U.S. needs an industrial policy,” Harvard Business Review, no. January-February 1982 
(1982); RD Norton, “Industrial policy and American renewal,” Journal of Economic Literature 24, no. 1 (1986).
80 Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf, Beyond the Wasteland., 209; Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes., 243-45; Ferguson 
and Rogers, Right turn., 156-60; Stein, Running steel., 282-287.
81 Sanders, Roots of reform; ibid; McCartin, Labor’s great war; Garry Gerstle, American crucible: Race and nation in 
the twentieth century (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Teixeria and Haplin, Progressive Tradi-
tion; Kalman, Legal Liberalism., 132-166; Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent., 123-168. 
82 Alan L. Seltzer, “Woodrow Wilson as ‘Corporate-Liberal’: Toward a Reconsideration of Left Revisionist Histo-
riography,” The Western Political Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1977); Naomi R Lamoreaux, “Martin Sklar’s The Corporate 
Reconstruction of American Capitalism: An Economic Historian’s Perspective,” Business and Economic History 
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
30 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
Other liberal thinkers, including many journalistic chroniclers of industrial decline, focused on 
the failures of enterprise management (and sometimes unions): short-termism, Taylorist work 
management, complacency and indifference to competiveness. Inspired by the cooperative 
capitalism of Japan and Germany they argued for an economy based on a more skilled workforce 
engaged in high-quality production.83 
Critics further to the left focused on the labour process; Samuel Bowles argued that capitalists ‘will 
generally select methods of production which forego improvements in productive efficiency in 
favour of maintaining their power over workers’. Bowles and his colleagues argued that a radical 
democratisation of workplaces would increase productivity. They neglected the extent to which 
management was more than labour control and they gave little attention to issues of marketing. 
Both the early proponents of scientific management and their later radical critics of the ‘labour 
process’ school largely focused on industries, such as metalworking, where production was small 
scale and marketing less significant. This tradition of liberal emphasis on production rather than 
marketing had a long history. In 1910 Louis Brandeis as representative of shippers had persuaded 
the Interstate Commerce Commission to refuse an application from railroads to increase freight 
charges. Brandeis argued that the railways had failed to adopt scientific management that would 
enable them to reduce costs. This approach legitimated populist hostility to railroad increases with 
the result that the railroads found themselves unable to respond to increasing costs, and from 
growing competition from other modes of transport, whilst in practice the applicability of scientific 
management to railroads was far more limited than Brandeis argued. Congress, to which the ICC 
deferred, was reluctant to admit that the cost pressures on railroads. A fundamental deficiency of 
radical critiques of American corporate capitalism was neglect of the agency of consumers.84
It was the agency of consumers not workers’ collective action or a newly interventionist state that 
began to impel industrial revival from the early 1990s. Stagnant living standards generated demand 
for more economic and efficient major consumption goods, such as smaller cars. Companies such 
as Toyota that functioned as organising forces within networks of autonomous businesses rather 
than traditional industrial monoliths adapted more quickly to changing consumer patterns, just as 
the first multidivisional firms outperformed their unitary rivals. New specialty retailers challenged 
older retailers through their closer attention to patterns of consumer demand. Even ‘smokestack’ 
industries such as steel joined in the revitalisation with the rapid growth in the number of ‘minimills’. 
The result was that the level of corporate concentration fell across 1980 to 2000 despite the merger 
wave of the 1980s .85 
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liberalism renewed?
The dominant trend of Democratic politics diverged from the liberal nostalgia for progressivism and 
the New Deal. Centrist Democrats argued for fidelity to the spirit rather than the letter of Wilson’s 
legacy and for them this meant accommodation to the new capitalism and the tasks of wealth 
creation not just redistribution. Many looked towards Japan as a model of activist government and 
of a collectivist entrepreneurship. In retrospect they overemphasised the role of government in the 
Japanese economy, and gave insufficient attention to the decentralised forms of Japanese industrial 
organisation.86
In 1992 the Democrats under Bill Clinton finally recaptured the presidency. Their victory owed 
something to the broader sense of national decline but was largely the result of the mild recession 
of the early 1990s. After three successive electoral defeats Clinton’s ‘new Democrats’ stressed the 
virtues of entrepreneurship, education and infrastructure expenditure for a global and information 
driven economy and appealed to affluent ‘wired workers’. They won significant support from many 
in Silicon Valley. They distanced themselves from the 1980s advocates of industrial policy.87 
Clinton’s concern with national competiveness echoed Theodore Roosevelt’s progressivism. Some 
economists feared that it implied a neo-mercantilist turn towards support of ‘national champions’ 
and that some unionists hoped it meant a new focus on high-technology manufacturing. Clinton 
disappointed these hopes and fears his administration employed the rhetoric of competiveness to 
justify a conservative fiscal policy and trade liberalisation.88 
The economic recovery that commenced from the mid 1980s had contributed to the Republican 
victories of 1984 and 1988 although voter concern persisted about trade and budget deficits. 
Academic economists and policy analysts were more concerned with the continued stagnation in 
productivity growth despite major investment in new technologies such as Information Technology 
(IT). However from the mid 1990s productivity growth surged. A major contribution to this recovery 
was made by retail in particular ‘Big Box’ stores such as Wal-Mart. For the first time retail became a 
major focus of management studies. Many economists argued that after a long delay investment 
in IT had finally yielded benefits. The mood of much liberal commentary shifted sharply. In 1990 a 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology research team had articulated a strategy for ‘regaining the 
productive edge’ but in 1998 a follow-up publication cautioned against drastic change. Even radical 
critics of capitalism admitted the productivity upsurge although they disputed its significance. 
The productivity upsurge contributed to the rapid reduction in the federal deficit. With inflationary 
expectations broken by the 1980s recession unemployment fell sharply with little impact on 
inflation. Economic liberals outside the US, such as Australian journalist Paul Kelly took the American 
resurgence as evidence of the importance of flexible markets and as refutation of social democratic 
arguments for increased human capital expenditure.89 
86 Robert Reich, “Entrepreneurship reconsidered: the team as hero,” Harvard Business Review, no. May-June 
(1987); Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Clinton (Wash-
inton, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1994)., 495; Richard K. Lester, The Productive Edge: A New Strategy for 
Economic Growth (New York, NY: Norton, 1998).
87 K. Baer, Reinventing democrats : the politics of liberalism from Reagan to Clinton (Lawrence, KS.: University 
Press of Kansas, 2000)., 33-43, 166-169, 214, 234-235, 257; Richard B. McKenzie, Trust on Trial: How the Micro-
soft Case is Reframing the Rules of Competition (Cambridge, MA.: Perseus Publishing, 2000)., 192-197
88 David Vogel, “The Triumph of Liberal Trade: American Trade Policy in the Postwar Period,” in Taking Stock: 
American Government in the Twentieth Century, ed. Morton Keller and R. Shep Melnick (New York, NY: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999)., 41-53; Joseph H Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties: Why We’re Paying the Price for 
the Greediest Decade in History (London: Penguin, 2004); Lynn Williams, “Reinventing Labor,” Harvard Business 
Review, no. July-August (1993)., 118; Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement., 335-36; Paul 
R. Krugman, Pop internationalism (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997).
89 Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow, Made in America; Thurow, Head to head., 163-166; Robert Brenner, The boom 
and the bubble: the US in the world economy (Verso Books, 2003)., 218-38; Dale H. Jorgenson, Mun S. Ho, and 
Kevin J. Stiroh, A retrospective look at the US productivity growth resurgence (New York, NY: Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, 2003)., 3; Paul R. Krugman, The return of depression economics and the crisis of 2008 (New 
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
32 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
Widespread use of IT was only part of the reforms that increased enterprise productivity. Transaction 
cost economists had defended managerial prerogative and argued that workers were compensated 
for alienation at the workplace by higher pay rates. However innovations in human resource 
management such as flexible job definitions, training, work teams, and incentive pay contributed 
substantially to the productivity upsurge.90 
Early twentieth-century conservatives had tacked to the left, as with Roosevelt’s trust-busting, 
to maintain support from an electorate deeply suspicious of corporate power. President Clinton 
tacked to the right and sometimes relied on Congressional Republicans to overcome the 
opposition of the increasingly liberal Congressional Democrats on issues such as welfare reform 
and trade liberalization. In both cases presidents responded to electorate-wide concerns with living 
standards.91 
Despite the economic boom under Clinton and his moderate policies Democratic relations with 
business never became as close as during the 1960s. Business was frequently pragmatic in support 
for Democratic incumbents, particularly as the conservative hopes raised by the 1994 Republican 
sweep of Congress ebbed, but Republicans enjoyed disproportionate business support. Media 
commentary was preoccupied by working-class conservatism but in fact cultural factors were most 
significant as a determinant of electoral behaviour among wealthy voters, for whom cultural politics 
of either the left or right was consumption good. Managers of large firms overall however remained 
consistently conservative in their voting behaviour, small businessmen and entrepreneurs moved 
rightward from the 1960s whilst professionals and routine white-collar workers moved leftward. In 
large corporations political disagreements between Republicans and Democrats could add fuel to 
personal rivalries.92 
The theorists of ‘corporate liberalism’ had argued that American liberalism, whether by conscious 
conspiracy or an unexplained process of structural determination, had come to serve the purposes 
of capital accumulation. However American capitalists disagreed with the theory and as the 
Democrats became more homogenously liberal business became more and formally aligned 
with conservative Republicanism. The liberal Democratic ascendancy of the 1960s gave way to 
the triumph of a remarkably conservative Republicanism, the conservative backlash of the 1970s 
identified problems of opportunism and bounded rationality as endemic not to capitalism but to 
the state. 
By the early twenty-first American capital was divided on regional and cultural grounds as it had 
been in the later 19th century. As in the 1890s populist Democrats complained about the influence 
of wealthy ‘cultural Democrats’ on their party and conservatives seeking populist credibility echoed 
these complaints. However analysis of the political contributions of board members and of 
employees from major corporations found that new economy firms, such as those in IT, tended to 
the left and resources industries to the right, with contributions from the finance sector evenly split. 
It was mostly public opinion, not the influence of the wealthy that pulled Democrats to the right. 
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The political orientations of corporations and their employees reflected in part their market position 
and the extent to which their internal structure was hierarchical or collegial. Microsoft’s financial 
contributions were split evenly between liberal and conservative candidates, unlike newer and 
smaller IT companies such as Google whose contributions skewed strongly to the left. In the long-
run however the success of enterprises such as Google would probably depend on them following 
the path of IBM and turning from cutting edge innovation to the servicing of corporate clients. The 
political views of their staff and owners would then be expected to shift to the right. The liberal 
sympathies of some IT capitalists, such as Larry Ellison or Bill Gates, were also of a particular variety, 
they were strong supporters of market-friendly reforms to public education and hostile to teacher 
unionism.93 
Joseph Schumpeter had argued that the rationalisation and bureaucratisation of corporate 
capitalism would undercut the legitimacy of capitalism. This argument might seem refuted by the 
consistent conservatism of corporate capitalists and by the complete marginalisation of socialism in 
post-war America. However the dominance of corporate capitalism shifted the political landscape 
to the left. The American business conservatism of the 1950s was quite distinct from that of the 
1990s. The Japanese political left has always been marginal but at its peak the Japanese model of 
consensual capitalism was notably egalitarian compared to other capitalist economics. Lech Walesa 
once described Japan as a country where socialism worked. In the short-term Bill Clinton seemed 
to have revived American liberalism yet his political ascendancy was not underpinned by broader 
institutional changes. The New Deal had created a new political order that endured the Republican 
revival of the 1950s and the cold war, Clinton left only memories of a golden age of peace and 
prosperity between the fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11. After 2000 the Republicans would speedily 
dismantle his legacy.94
Antitrust policy during the Clinton presidency demonstrated a partial continuity between the new 
Democrats and their populist antecedents. The Democrats accepted that antitrust policy should 
promote efficiency rather than defend small business for its own sake but adopted the arguments 
of the ‘post-Chicago’ school that market dominance particularly in high technology and network 
industries could suppress innovation. The government took a more aggressive antitrust approach 
best represented by its pursuit of Microsoft. The suit against Microsoft had the support of some 
Chicago School critics of the populist antitrust legacy but liberals more sympathetic to the populist 
tradition were critical of Clinton’s antitrust performance.95
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In the best of times in the late 1990s observers gave little attention to emerging systemic problems 
in the US economy. Clintonian Democrats celebrated the ‘new economy’ and predicted a 
continuation of the productivity upsurge, their left wing critics complained that productivity growth 
was overstated and that social inequality persisted.96
In these best of times the American economy became increasingly financialised. Marxists had long 
been preoccupied by ‘finance capital’ but tended to interpret this as the dominance of a discrete 
financial sector rather than the widespread dissemination of financial means of control. The financial 
sector remained a small portion of overall employment but absorbed an increasing share of 
national income and made a major contribution to increased income inequality. The coordination 
tasks once undertaken by corporate bureaucracies became the responsibility of ever larger financial 
institutions which like many of the fin-de-siècle trusts failed to demonstrate economies of scale. 
Even within non-financial enterprises Chief Financial Officers rose to prominence from the late 
1970s in response both to inflation and shareholder activism.97 
Also noteworthy during this period, particularly after tax legislation reforms in 1986 removed 
disincentives, was the disaggregation of multidivisional enterprises into a network of Multi-level 
subsidiary firms (MLSF). The rise of the MLSF seemed the triumph of the invisible hand: external 
financial markets were to take over the enforcement of profit targets on the former divisions, now 
separate corporations, of the old M-form. Firms less involved in direct political lobbying were more 
likely to pursue disaggregation.98 
The rise of the MLSF and broader trends towards financialisation and disaggregation sparked 
debate among observers. David Langlois argued that improved communication and management 
techniques presaged the final demise of the Chandlerian ‘visible hand’; markets had finally caught 
up with technology. He instanced the American mortgage market as an example of economic 
disaggregation. At its peak this argument suggested that the libertarian vision of the firm as a nexus 
of contracts had finally eventuated. Namoi Lamoreaux and others dissented that business history 
had not come to an end, and that in an environment of unpredictability and rapid change the 
optimum method of economic coordination would change constantly. Bounded rationality meant 
that organizational innovations were sometimes the result of fads and fashions as less innovative 
enterprises scrambled to catch up with corporate leaders. New forms of economic organization 
such as outsourcing were not in all cases a rational response to the economic environment but 
could reflect the influences of fads and fashions .99 
the panic of 2007 and after
The political fortunes of American liberalism were closely linked to understandings of corporate 
enterprise. For much of the 20th century antitrust populism provided a rallying point, congruent 
with national values and consistent with the weakness of the American state. The bureaucrats of 
the great Chandlerian corporations were never themselves liberals but their corporate practice in 
some aspects represented liberal and even socialist values. A political struggle within and without 
96 D. Henwood, After the New Economy (Melbourne: Scribe, 2003)., 56-143; DeLong, Basu, and Jovanovic, “Pro-
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the large corporations from the 1970s transformed the structure of American capitalism. The rise of 
Chicago school economics in the 1970s and the decline of the Chandlerian corporation challenged 
the populist tradition. In the 1990s Liberal antitrust regrouped around a focus on innovation. 
Netscape replaced the ‘mom and pop’ store as the victim of monopoly. Yet this new liberalism gave 
little attention to how enterprise disaggregation and financialisation meant that principal-agent 
problems were of constantly growing importance. 
The financial panic that commenced in 2007 demonstrated that problems of opportunism and 
bounded rationality were endemic within the ‘new economy’. Observers had already argued that 
restructuring could be counterproductive directed to generate short-term share price increases and 
consequent increases in managerial remuneration and that the MLSF opened way to opportunism 
as demonstrated in the collapse of Enron in 2001.100 
The events of 2007 demonstrated that business history had not come to an end. It was clear 
that economic structures had not evolved by a process of Darwinian competition to the best 
of all possible worlds. The political triumphs of the Republican right after 2000 and the slowing 
of economic growth after the busting of the ‘dot.com’ bubble had already encouraged some 
Democrats to call, in a muted revival of the themes of the early 1980s, for a more activist state. 
The 2007 crisis radicalised many. Some economists and former Clintonian Democrats shifted 
leftward, like Paul Krugman, and called, like the old institutional economists, for economic inquiry 
to take a more inductive and historical turn. Long forgotten concerns about managerial autonomy 
from shareholders, wage stagnation, competiveness in high technology products and the future 
of manufacturing suddenly reappeared as topics of liberal discussion and Democratic political 
strategy.101 
In the election of 2008 Barack Obama appealed to an electorate fearful of the emerging economic 
crisis and to a liberal constituency traumatised by the Presidency of George Bush. As President 
however Obama was slow to realise, if he ever fully did, that the Bush years were not simply an 
aberrant product of an illegitimate ‘victory’ in 2000 and the forced patriotism of the ‘war on terror’. 
The economic model that Clinton had championed had slowly expired from the bursting of the 
dot.com bubble in 2000-2001. Obama, like most mainstream Democrats had invited support from 
the financial sector, and continued to do so during his term, and had supported the unpopular 
‘bailout’ of financial institutions. Obama followed in the footsteps of Woodrow Wilson when the 
times called for a new Franklin Roosevelt. Obama’s record in government disappointed many 
liberals and dissent rose to new heights in 2011 as the economic recovery ebbed. Many argued 
that the President should have advocated a far more ambitious stimulus package in early 2009 and 
accused him of having capitulated to conservative economic orthodoxy. Legislative initiatives that 
sought to impose constraints on executive pay as conditions of government financial support had 
little impact. Obama’s liberal critics included some such as Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman who 
had previously supported Bill Clinton’s fiscal conservatism and pursuit of free trade, despite the 
angst this had generated among many traditional liberals. The liberal critics of Obama struggled 
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to explain why his performance was disappointing. Some emphasized his personal deficiencies 
others revived, often without acknowledgement, aspects of older radical critiques of ‘corporate 
liberalism’ with financiers and rentiers now rather than General Motors or Ford cast as the new ruling 
class. The attempt to revive corporate liberalism struggled to explain the progressive alienation 
of many of Obama’s former supporters from the finance industry. Academic analysts of politics 
preferred to emphasise the institutional blockages to decisive Presidential action and the economic 
conservatism of American public opinion.102
conclusion
American liberalism has been shaped by both the crises and triumphs of capitalism. In the 1970s 
Democratic President Jimmy Carter like Grover Cleveland in the 1890s was unable to effectively 
respond to an economic crisis and thus encouraged the mass defection of working-class voters to 
the right. The 1930s provided the opposite example as the successful response of the Democrats to 
the Great Depression initiated a fundamental realignment. The establishment of the Federal Reserve 
was an effective response by Wilson to the panic of 1907 and contributed to Wilson’s re-election 
in 1916. The capitalist boom of the 1950s and 1960s underpinned the rapprochement between 
unions and business in the core industrial sector that sustained the liberal gains of the New Deal. 
The economic boom of the later 1990s contributed to Bill Clinton’s success and established in the 
mind of voters a connection between the Democrats and economic prosperity that powerfully 
advantaged Obama in 2008 as economic issues came to preoccupy voters. This was despite the fact 
that the roots of the panic of 2007 lay in the financialised and debt-fuelled capitalism that Clinton 
had celebrated. 
By late 2011 the crisis of American capitalism, like those of the 1890s, 1930s and 1970s, had inspired 
a crisis of liberalism, but whether this crisis would result in renewal as in the 1930s or collapse as 
in the 1890s remained unclear. The resurgent Republicans echoed the themes of McKinley’s 1896 
campaign, including advocacy of a deflationary monetary policy and accused the ‘anti-business’ 
Democrats of responsibility for the recession. Mitt Romney, the leading candidate for the 2012 
Republican nomination, more directly represented corporate capitalism than almost any other past 
Republican nominee. Romney may have been personally distant from the evangelical conservatism 
of the Republican base but contrary to what theorists of corporate liberalism would have predicted 
he was untroubled to pledge allegiance to socially conservative values. As the euphoria of Obama’s 
election dissipated a renascent radical left, although still tiny, echoed the themes of the 1960s 
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new left critic of liberalism. ‘Occupy Wall Street’ might presage the emergence of a new economic 
populism of the left.103 
Despite these trends it would be too early to write off either American liberalism or American 
capitalism. Even in the midst of the current severe recession an international study that tracked 
10,000 firms in twenty countries across a decade identified American management as still the best 
in the world. The hyper-rationalisation and individualisation characteristic of late capitalist culture 
undercut the left’s hopes for collective agency but it also eroded popular support for the pietistic 
social conservatism of the Republicans. A year out from the 2012 Presidential election the American 
future was more contested and uncertain that at any time since the 1890s and 1930s.104
103 Shira Schoenberg, “Romney sharpens attacks on Obama in N.H.,” Boston.com(2011), http://www.boston.
com/Boston/politicalintelligence/2011/08/romney-sharpens-attacks-obama/nUJQLy5BOWBVvJ8xpvkeKI/
index.html.
104 Nicholas Bloom et al., “Why American Management Rules the World “ in Harvard Business Review. The Con-
versation (2011); Richard Harvey Brown, Culture, Capitalism, and Democracy in the New America (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2005); Satterthwaite, Going shopping., 166
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
38 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
r e f e r e n c e s
Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. “Myopic Retrospection and Party Realignment in the Great 
Depression.” http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/myopicretrospectionrealignmentdepression.pdf. 
<Accessed 6 October 2011 >. 2008.
Aglietta, Michel. A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: the US experience. London: New Left Books.1979.
Alchian, Armen, and Harold Demsetz. “Production, information costs, and economic organization.” The 
American Economic Review, vol. 62, no. 5 (1972).
Aldrich, John. Why parties?: The origin and transformation of political parties in America. Chicago, IL.: 
University of Chicago Press.1995.
Allen, Michael P. “Capitalist responses to state intervention: Theories of the state and political finance in 
the New Deal.” American Sociological Review, vol. 56, no. 5 (1991).
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: 
Verso.1991.
Araujo, Luis, and Lars-Erik Gadde. “Efficiency-seeking or recipe-following? The case of outsourcing.” Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the 25th Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group Conference, 
Marseille, France, 2009. http://impgroup.org/uploads/papers/7047.pdf. <Accessed 7 November 
2010>.
Arnold, Thurman. “Must 1929 Repeat Itself?” Harvard Business Review, vol. 26 (1948).
Baer, K. Reinventing democrats : the politics of liberalism from Reagan to Clinton. Lawrence, KS.: University 
Press of Kansas.2000.
Baldwin, William. “Efficiency and competition: The Reagan administration’s legacy in merger policy.” 
Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 5, no. 2 (1990).
Balto, David. “Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton Administration.” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 
vol. 9 (1999).
Baran, P., and P. Sweezy. Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Social and Economic Order. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin.1968.
Barkan, Joanne. “Got Dough? How Billionaires Rule Our Schools.” Dissent. Winter, http://www.
dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=3781. 2011.<Accessed 10 October 2011>.
Barnett-Hart, Anna. “The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis.” Bachelor of Arts 
(Hons), Harvard University, 2009.
Baumol, William J. The free-market innovation machine : analyzing the growth miracle of capitalism. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.2002.
Bell, Daniel. The end of ideology: On the exhaustion of political ideas. New York: Free Press; Collier-
Macmillan.1965.
Berle, Adolph. “Corporations and the Modern State.” In The Future of Democratic Capitalism, edited by S.H. 
Patterson, 35-62. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1950.
Berle, Adolph, and Gardiner Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York, NY.: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc.1968.
Bernstein, Jonathan.2011. “Public Opinion Isn’t Forcing Spending Cuts.”A plain blog about politics. http://
plainblogaboutpolitics.blogspot.com/2011/08/public-opinion-isnt-forcing-spending.html. <Accessed 
4 August 2011>.
Bloom, Nicholas, Rebecca Homkes, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen.2011. “Why American 
Management Rules the World “Harvard Business Review. The Conversation. http://blogs.hbr.org/
cs/2011/06/why_american_management_rules.html. <Accessed 18 June 2011>.
Bonica, Adam.2010. “Citizens United and the Myth of a Conservative Corporate America.”Ideological 
Cartography. http://ideologicalcartography.com/2010/07/12/citizens-united-and-the-myth-of-a-
conservative-corporate-america. <Accessed 21 July 2010>.
Bork, Robert. The antitrust paradox: A policy at war with itself. New York, NY.: The Free Press.1993.
———. “High-Stakes Antitrust: The Last Hurrah?” In High-Stakes Antitrust: The Last Hurrah?, edited by R. 
Hahn, 45-71. Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Center for Regulatory Studies. 2003.
Bowles, Samuel. “The production process in a competitive economy: Walrasian, neo-Hobbesian, and 
Marxian models.” The American Economic Review, vol. 75, no. 1 (1985).
Bowles, Samuel, David Gordon, and Thomas Weisskopf. Beyond the Wasteland: A Democratic Alternative to 
Economic Decline. London: Verso.1986.
Bowman, Scott. The modern corporation and American political thought: law, power, and ideology. University 
Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press.1996.
discovery
application
excellence 39
Brady, Robert. Business as a System of Power. New York, NY.: Columbia University Press.1943.
Brand, D. “Competition and the New Deal Regulatory State.” In The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism, 
edited by S. Milkis and J. Mileur, 166-92. Amherst, MA.: University of Massachusetts Press. 2002.
Brandeis, L. “The Regulation of Competition Versus the Regulation of Monopoly.” http://www.law.
louisville.edu.au/library/collections/brandeis/node/260. <Accessed 10 December 2009 >. 1912.
Braverman, Harry. Labor and monopoly capital: The degradation of work in the 20th century. New York, NY: 
Monthly Review Press.1974.
Brenner, Robert. The boom and the bubble: the US in the world economy: Verso Books.2003.
Brenner, Robert, and Mark Glick. “The regulation approach: theory and history.” New Left Review, vol. 188 
(1991).
Brick, H. “The Postcapitalist Vision in Twentieth-Century Social Thought.” In American Capitalism: Social 
Thought and Political Economy in the Twentieth Century, edited by N. Lichtenstein, 21-46. Philadelphia, 
PA.: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2006.
Brinkley, Alan. The end of reform: New Deal liberalism in recession and war: Alfred A Knopf Inc.1995.
Brody, David. Steelworkers in America: the Nonunion Era. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.1960.
Brookings Institution. “The Hamilton Project. About Us.” http://www.brookings.edu/projects/
hamiltonproject/About-Us.aspx. <Accessed 15 September 2010 >. 2010.
Brown, Richard Harvey. Culture, Capitalism, and Democracy in the New America. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.2005.
Bryan, W. J. “Cross of Gold.” http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=163. 
<Accessed 4 March 2010 >. 1896.
Bryan, William J. “The Problem of the Trusts.” New York Times, 11 November 1911.
Bryan, William J. “Bryan’s Thirteen Questions.” New York Times, 18 July 1911.
Burnham, Walter D. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Co.1970.
Burris, Val. “The two faces of capital: Corporations and individual capitalists as political actors.” American 
Sociological Review, vol. (2001).
Burris, Val, and James Salt. “The Politics of Capitalist Class Segments: A Test of Corporate Liberalism 
Theory.” Social Problems, vol. 37 (1990).
Burrough, B, and J Helyar. Barbarians at the Gate: The fall of RJR Nabisco: Harper Paperbacks.1991.
Caldwell, Christopher. “American Oligarchy.” The Weekly Standard, vol. 15, no. 32 (2009).
Callahan, David. “The Real Liberal Elite.” The American Prospect, 1 September 2010.
Caplan, Bryan. “Kolko 40 Years Later.” http://www.mail-archive.com/armchair@gmu.edu/msg03394.html. 
<Accessed 28 September 2010 >. 2003.
Chandler, Alfred D. Strategy and structure : chapters in the history of the American industrial enterprise. 
Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.1969.
———. The visible hand : the managerial revolution in American business. Cambridge, MA.: Belknap 
Press.1977.
Christian, David. Maps of time : an introduction to big history. Berkeley., California: University of California 
Press.2004.
Coase, Richard. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, vol. 4, no. 16 (1937).
Cochran, Thomas C., and William Miller. The age of enterprise: a social history of industrial America. Rev. ed. 
New York,: Harper.1961.
Cohan, William D. House of cards: how Wall Street’s gamblers broke capitalism. New York, NY: 
Doubleday.2010.
Cohen, Nancy. The reconstruction of American liberalism, 1865-1914. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of 
North Carolina Press.2002.
Colletti, Lucio. “Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second International.” In From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies 
in Ideology and Society, edited by Lucio Colleti, 45-108. New York, NY.: Monthly Review Press. 1969.
Craig, Douglas. After Wilson: the struggle for the Democratic Party, 1920-1934. Chapel Hill, NC.: University of 
North Carolina Press.1993.
Craig, Susanne, and Ben Protess. “Others Go, but Buffett Stays on President’s Side.” New York Times, 2 
October 2011.
Dahl, RA. A preface to economic democracy: Berkeley, CA. University of California Press.1986.
“Danger to Democrats if Bryan Wins Fight.” New York Times, 25 June 1912.
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
40 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
Dark, Taylor. “Organized Labor and the Carter Administration: The Origins of Conflict.” In The Presidency and 
Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter, edited by H. D. Rosenbaum, 761-82. Westport, CI.: Greenwood Press. 
1994.
Davidoff, Steven M. “Efforts to Rein In Executive Pay Meet With Little Success.” New York Times, 12 July 
2011.
Davis, Gerald F., Kristina A. Diekmann, and Catherine H. Tinsley. “The decline and fall of the conglomerate 
firm in the 1980s: The deinstitutionalization of an organizational form.” American Sociological Review, 
vol. 59, no. 4 (1994).
De Tocqueville, Alexander. Democracy in America: And Two Essays on America. London: Penguin 2003.
DeGraaf, Leonard. “Corporate Liberalism and Electric Power System Planning in the 1920s.” Business History 
Review, vol. 64, no. 1 (1990).
DeLong, J. Brad, Susanto Basu, and Boyan Jovanovic. “Productivity Growth in the 2000s.” In NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2002, edited by Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, 113-58. Cambridge, MA.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 2002.
DeLong, J. Brad. 2011. “I Am Now, and Have for Eighteen Years Been, a Rubinite...”Grasping Reality. http://
delong.typepad.com/sdj/2011/01/i-am-now-and-have-for-eighteen-years-been-a-rubinite.html. 
<Accessed 7 January 2011>.
Democratic Party. “1912 Democratic Party Platform.” http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=29590. <Accessed 3 June 2010 >. 1912.
Dertouzos, Michael L., Richard K. Lester, and Richard M. Solow. Made in America: Regaining the productive 
edge. New York, NY.: HarperPrerennial.1990.
Desai, Meghnad. Marx’s Revenge: The Resurgence of Capitalism and the Death of Statist Socialism. London: 
Verso.2004.
Douglas, Paul H. Real wages in the United States, 1890-1926. Boston, MA.: Houghton Mifflin.1930.
Drum, Kevin. “The American Public Hates Stimulus Spending.” Mother Jones, http://motherjones.com/
kevin-drum/2011/07/american-public-hates-stimulus-spending. 2011.<Accessed 7 July 2011>.
Eads, George, Arthur Levitt, Thomas McCraw, Robert Reich, and Lester C. Thurow. “The political realities of 
industrial policy.” Harvard Business Review, vol. 61, no. 5 (1983).
Edwards, Alba. Comparative Occupational Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office.1943.
Emmott, B. Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India, and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade. 
London: Penguin.2009.
Fama, Eugene F. “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.” The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88, no. 
2 (1980).
Ferguson, Thomas. Golden rule: The investment theory of party competition and the logic of money-driven 
political systems. Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press.1995.
Ferguson, Thomas, and Joel Rogers. Right turn: The decline of the Democrats and the future of American 
politics: Hill and Wang.1987.
Fligstein, Neil. The transformation of corporate control. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.1990.
Freyer, Tony A. Antitrust and global capitalism, 1930-2004. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.2006.
———. Regulating big business: antitrust in Great Britain and America, 1880-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.1992.
Galambos, Louis. “The Agrarian Image of the Large Corporation, 1879-1920: A Study in Social 
Accommodation.” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 28, no. 3 (1968).
———. “What have CEOs been doing?” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 48, no. 2 (1988).
Galbraith, John K. American capitalism: the concept of countervailing power. Boston, MA.: Houghton 
Mifflin.1952.
———. The New Industrial State. London: Hamish Hamilton.1967.
Gelman, Andrew. Red state, blue state, rich state, poor state: why Americans vote the way they do. Princeton, 
NJ.: Princeton University Press.2008.
———.2011. “A simple theory of why Obama didn’t come out fighting in 2009.”The Monkeycage. http://
themonkeycage.org/blog/2011/08/08/a-simple-theory-of-why-didnt-obama-come-out-fighting-
in-2009. <Accessed 16 August 2011>.
Gerstle, Garry. American crucible: Race and nation in the twentieth century. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton 
University Press.2002.
discovery
application
excellence 41
Ghosal, Vivek. Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics and Enforcement. Altlanta, GA.: Georgia Institute of 
Technology; Center for Economic Studies.2011.
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York, NY: International.1971.
Greenspan, Alan. “The Crisis.” In Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, edited by David H. Romer and Justin 
Wolders. Washington, DC.: Brookings Institute. 2010.
Hamilton, Shane. “The Populist Appeal of Deregulation: Independent Truckers and the Politics of Free 
Enterprise, 1935–1980.” Enterprise & Society, vol. 10, no. 1 (2009).
Harrison, Bennett, and Barry Bluestone. The Great U-turn: Corporate restructuring and the polarizing of 
America. New York: Basic Books.1990.
Hart, Herbert L. A. The Concept of Law Oxford: Clarendon Press.1961.
Hartz, Louis. “United States History in a New Perspective.” In The founding of new societies: studies in the 
history of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia, edited by Louis Hartz. 
New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World 1964.
Hawley, Ellis W. “The Discovery and Study of a ‘Corporate Liberalism’.” Business History Review, vol. 52, no. 3 
(1978).
———. The New Deal and the problem of monopoly: A study in economic ambivalence. New York, NY.: 
Fordham University Press.1995.
Hayes, Robert, and Stephen Wheelwright. Restoring our competitive edge: Competing through 
manufacturing. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc.1984.
Henwood, D. After the New Economy. Melbourne: Scribe.2003.
Heydon, J. Dyson. The restraint of trade doctrine. 3 ed. Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths.2008.
Hicks, John. A theory of economic history. Oxford: Oxford University Press.1973.
Hintze, Otto. “Economics and Politics in the Age of Modern Capitalism (1929).” In The Historical Essays of 
Otto Hintze, edited by Felix Gilbert. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 1975.
Hoerr, John P. And the Wolf Finally Came: The Decline of the American Steel Industry. Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press.1988.
Hofstader, R. “What Happended to the Antitrust Movement?” In The Paranoid Style in American Politics and 
Other Essays, edited by R. Hofstader, 188-232. Harvard, MA.: Harvard University Press. 1964.
Horwitz, Morton J. The transformation of American law, 1870-1960: The crisis of legal orthodoxy. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.1994.
Houck, Stephen D. “Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Industries.” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 
vol. 9 (1999).
Hounsell, David. From the American System to Mass Production: 1800-1932. Baltimore, MD.: John Hopkins 
University Press.1984.
Hovenkamp, Herbert. Enterprise and American law, 1836-1937. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University 
Press.1991.
———. The Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust. Iowa City, IA.: University of Iowa Legal Studies Research 
Paper 09-09.2009.
Interrante, Jake, and Bob Cusack. “Wall Street executives turn back on Obama, start donating to Romney.” 
The Hill. 22 August, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/177675-wall-street-execs-turn-back-on-
obama-give-to-romney?wpisrc=nl_fix. 2011.<Accessed 9 October 2011>.
Jacoby, Neil H. “Splitting Apart Big Oil.” New York Times, 18 June 1976.
Jorgenson, Dale H., Mun S. Ho, and Kevin J. Stiroh. A retrospective look at the US productivity growth 
resurgence. New York, NY: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.2003.
Kalman, Laura. The strange career of legal liberalism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.1998.
Kefauver, Estes. “Needed Changes in Legislation.” The American Economic Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (1948).
Keller, M. “Trade Policy in Historical Perspective.” In Taking Stock: American Government in the Twentieth 
Century, edited by M. Keller and R. S. Melnick, 15-34. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999.
Kelly, Paul. “Knowledge is not enough.” The Australian, 23 June 2001.
Kempton, Murray. “Blue Collar Blues.” New York Review of Books, February 8 1973.
Klausen, J. “Did World War II End the New Deal?” In The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism, edited by S. 
Milkis and J. Mileuer, 193-230. Amerst, MA.: University of Massachusetts Press. 2002.
Klein, Erza. “The Senate Democrats’ disappointing final act.” Washington Post, 27 September 2010.
Kleppner, Paul. The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900. New York, NY: Free 
Press.1970.
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
42 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
Kolko, Gabriel. Railroads and regulation: 1877-1916. New York, NY.: Norton.1970.
———. The triumph of conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916. New York, NY.: Free 
Press.1963.
Kovaleff, T. “The Carter Antitrust Policy in Perspective.” In The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy 
Carter, edited by H. D. Rosenbaum, 627-48. Westport, CI.: Greenwood Press. 1994.
Krier, Dan. Speculative management: stock market power and corporate change. New York, NY: State 
University of New York Press.2005.
Krippner, Greta. “The financialization of the American economy.” Socio-Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 2 
(2005).
Krock, Arthur. “Sham and Real Platform Planks Against Monopoly.” New York Times, 8 July 1936.
Krugman, Paul R. “1938 in 2010.” New York Times, 5 September 2010.
———. “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? .” New York Times, 2 September 2009.
———. Pop internationalism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.1997.
———. “The Rentier Regime.” New York Times, 6 June 2011.
———. The return of depression economics and the crisis of 2008. New York, NY: WW Norton & Co Inc.2009.
———. “Review of John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Good Society: The Humane Agenda.” http://www.
pkarchive.org/cranks/GalbraithGoodSociety.html. <Accessed 16 August 2011 >. 1996.
———. “The Wal-Mart Decade.” New York Times, 28 January 2011.
———. “What Obama Wants.” New York Times, 17 July 2011.
Kwoka, John, and Lawrence White. “Horizontal Structure: The Economic and Legal Context.” In The 
Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competion and Policy, edited by J. Kowka and L. White, 8-29. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2009.
“La Follette’s Platform.” New York Times, 6 July 1924.
Lakatos, I. “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs.” In Criticism and the Growth 
of knowledge, edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, 91-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1970.
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. “Martin Sklar’s The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism: An Economic 
Historian’s Perspective.” Business and Economic History, vol. 21 (1992).
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. The great merger movement in American business, 1895-1904. Cambridge Cambridge 
University Press.1985.
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., Daniel M.G Raff, and Peter Temin. “Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New 
Synthesis of American Business History.” American Historical Review, vol. 108 (2003).
Langlois, Richard N. “The vanishing hand: the changing dynamics of industrial capitalism.” Industrial and 
Corporate Change, vol. 12, no. 2 (2003).
Laski, Harold J. The State in Theory and Practice. London: George Allen & Unwin.1935.
Leip, David. “Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.” http://uselectionatlas.org. <Accessed 4 March 2011 >. 
2011.
Leontief, Wassily. “For a National Economic Planning Board.” New York Times, 14 March 1974.
Lester, Richard K. The Productive Edge: A New Strategy for Economic Growth. New York, NY: Norton.1998.
Lester, RK. The Productive Edge: A New Strategy for Economic Growth. New York: WW Norton.1998.
Levi, Margaret. Of rule and revenue. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.1989.
Lindblom, CE. Politics and Markets: the world’s poltical economic systems: Basic Books, New York, NY.1977.
Link, Arthur S. Woodrow Wilson and the progressive era, 1910-1917. New York: Harper & Row.1982.
Litan, Robert E, and Carl Shapiro. Antitrust policy during the Clinton administration. Berkeley, CA: 
Competition Policy Center, Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California, 
Berkeley.2001.
Lowi, Theodore. “The public philosophy: interest-group liberalism.” The American Political Science Review, 
vol. 61, no. 1 (1967).
Lustig, Richard. Corporate liberalism: The origins of modern American political theory, 1890-1920. Berkely, CA.: 
University of California Press.1982.
Lynch, Lisa M. The adoption and diffusion of organizational innovation: Evidence for the US economy, 
Institute for the Study of Labor. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.2007.
Mann, M. The sources of social power: A history of power from the beginning to AD 1760. Vol. 1. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.1986.
discovery
application
excellence 43
Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of knowledge. London: 
Routledge.1936.
Marglin, Stephen A. “What do bosses do? Part I.” Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 6, no. 2 (1974).
Marx, Karl. Capital: a critique of political economy. Vol. 1. Harmondsworth: Penguin.1976.
———. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. New York, NY.: International.1970.
Matusow, AJ. The Unraveling of America: A history of liberalism in the 1960s: Athens, GA., University of 
Georgia Press, 1989.1986.
“May Amend Sherman Law.” New York Times, 16 May 1911.
McCartin, Joseph A. Labor’s great war: the struggle for industrial democracy and the origins of modern 
American labor relations, 1912-1921. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.1997.
McCarty, N., K. Poole, and H. Rosenthal. “Polarized America.” http://voteview.com/Polarized_America.htm. 
<Accessed >. 2010.
McCraw, Thomas. Prophets of Regulation: Charles Franices Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. 
kahn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.1984.
McKenzie, Richard B. Trust on Trial: How the Microsoft Case is Reframing the Rules of Competition. Cambridge, 
MA.: Perseus Publishing.2000.
McQuaid, Kim. “Corporate liberalism in the American business community, 1920-1940.” Business History 
Review, vol. 52, no. 3 (1978).
Meyerson, Harold. “Wall Street Democrats vs. Main Street Democrats.” The American Prospect, http://www.
prospect.org/cs/articles?article=wall_street_democrats_vs_main_street_democrats. 2007.<Accessed 
14 May 2010>.
Milkis, S. “Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economic Constitutional Order, and the New Politics of Presidential 
Leadership.” In The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism, edited by S. Milkis and J. Mileur, 31-72. 
Amherst, MA.: University of Massachusetts Press. 2002.
Miller, Claire Cain. “Google Grows, and Works to Retain Nimble Minds.” New York Times, 28 November 2010.
Miller, Lloyd. “Lessons in longevity, from I.B.M.” New York Times, 18 June 2011.
Mills, C. Wright. The power elite. New York: Oxford University Press.1959.
Mink, Gwendolyn. Old labor and new immigrants in American political development: union, party, and state, 
1875-1920. New York, NY: Cornell University Press.1990.
Montgomery, Lori, and Brady Dennis. “New Democratic strategy for creating jobs focuses on a boost in 
manufacturing.” Washington Post, 4 August 2010.
Mowry, G. Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement: The University of Wisconsin Press.1946.
Mueller, Dennis C. Public choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.2003.
Noble, David F. America by design: Science, technology, and the rise of corporate capitalism. New York: Oxford 
University Press.1979.
Nordhaus, William. Retrospective on the Postwar Productivity Slowdown. Edited by Yale University Cowles 
Foundation. New Haven, CT.: Cowles Foundation, Yale University.2004.
North, Douglass C. Structure and change in economic history. 1st ed. New York: Norton.1981.
Northern Securities Company v. United States, 197 United States Reports 193 (1904).
Norton, RD. “Industrial policy and American renewal.” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 24, no. 1 (1986).
Novick, Peter. That noble dream: The ‘objectivity question’ and the American historical profession. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.1988.
Orren, Karen. “The Laws of Industrial Organization, 1870-1920.” In The Cambridge History of Law in America, 
vol. 2, The Long Nineteenth-Century (1789-1920), edited by Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins, 
531-67. Cambridge Cambridge University Press. 2008.
Orszag, Peter. “As Kaldor’s Facts Fall, Occupy Wall Street Rises.” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
10-19/kaldor-s-facts-fall-occupy-wall-street-rises-commentary-by-peter-orszag.html. <Accessed 7 
November 2011 >. 2011.
Palmer, Donald, Brad M. Barber, Xueguang Zhou, and Yasemin Soysal. “The friendly and predatory 
acquisition of large US corporations in the 1960s: The other contested terrain.” American Sociological 
Review, vol. 60, no. 4 (1995).
Perelman, Michael. “Constant Capital and the Crisis in Contemporary Capitalism: Echoes from the Late 
Nineteenth Century.” http://michaelperelman.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/constan.pdf. <Accessed 7 
July 2010 >. 2010.
Perlman, Selig. A Theory of the Labor Movement. Philadelphia, PA.: Porcupine Press.1979.
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
44 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
Pisano, Gary P., and Willy C. Shih. “Restoring American Competitiveness.” Harvard Business Review, vol. 87 
(2009).
Pitofsky, R. “Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century: A View from the Middle.” St John’s Law Review, 
vol. 76 (2002).
“Platform is Ready for the Convention.” New York Times, 28 June 1912.
Plotke, David. Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1996.
Populist Party. “Platform of the Populist Party.” http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.
asp?document=963. <Accessed 17 July 2010 >. 1892.
Posner, Richard A. Antitrust law. Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press.2001.
———. Overcoming law. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.1995.
Poulantzas, Nicos. Political power and social classes. London: New Left Books.1978.
Prasad, Monica. The politics of free markets: the rise of neoliberal economic policies in Britain, France, Germany, 
and the United States. Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press.2006.
Prechel, Harvey N. Big business and the state: Historical transitions and corporate transformation, 
1880s-1990s. New York, NY: State University of New York Press.2000.
Prechel, Harvey N., and John Boies. “Capital Dependence, Business Political Behavior, and Change to the 
Multilayered Subsidiary Form.” Social Problems, vol. 49, no. 3 (2002).
Progressive Party. “Declaration of Principles of the Progressive Party.” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/
presidents/26_t_roosevelt/psources/ps_trprogress.htm. <Accessed 3 March 2010 >. 1912.
Radosh, Ronald.2009. “America’s Socialist Future: Martin J. Sklar vs. John B. Judis.”Ron Radosh. http://
pajamasmedia.com/ronradosh/2009/06/03/americas-socialist-future-martin-j-sklar-vs-john-b-judis/. 
<Accessed 17 May 2010>.
Reich, Robert. “Entrepreneurship reconsidered: the team as hero.” Harvard Business Review, vol., no. May-
June (1987).
———. “Why the U.S. needs an industrial policy.” Harvard Business Review, vol., no. January-February 1982 
(1982).
Republican Party. “Platform.” http://projects.vassar.edu/1896/gopplatform.html. <Accessed 7 May 2010 >. 
1896.
Reutter, Mark. Making steel: Sparrows Point and the rise and ruin of American industrial might. Chicago, IL.: 
University of Illinois Press.2004.
Riggs, Douglas. “Consumer Goods.” New York Times, 23 February 1986.
Ritter, Gretchen. Goldbugs and Greenbacks: the antimonopoly tradition and the politics of finance in America. 
New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press.1999.
Robinson, Ronald. “Non-European foundations of European Imperialism: sketch for a theory of 
collaboration.” In Studies in the theory of imperialism, edited by Robert Owen and Bob Sutcliffe. 
London: Longman. 1972.
Roe, Mark J. “How capitalist is America?” Project Syndicate. 27 June, http://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/roe4/English. 2011.<Accessed 28 June 2011>.
———. Strong managers, weak owners: the political roots of American corporate finance. Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press.1996.
Rohatyn, Felix. “Public-Private Partnerships to Stave Off Disaster.” Harvard Business Review, vol. 57, no. 6 
(1979).
Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Recommendations relative to the strengthening and enforcement of the anti-trust 
laws “ American Economic Review, vol. 32, no. 2, part 2 (1942).
Roosevelt, Theodore. The new nationalism. New York: The Outlook Company.1910.
———. “The Strenuous Life.” http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=608. 
<Accessed 7 March 2010 >. 1899.
Rostow, Walter W. The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.1990.
Rothbard, Murray N. “The Hoover Myth [1966].” In For a New America: Essays in History and Politics from 
Studies on the Left, 1959-1967, edited by James Weinstein and David W. Eakins. New York, NY.: Vintage 
Books. 1970.
Rubinfield, Daniel. “Maintenance of Monopoly: U.S. v. Microsoft (2001).” In The Antitrust Revolution: 
Economics, Competition and Policy, edited by John Kwoka and Lawrence White, 530-57. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2009.
discovery
application
excellence 45
Sachs, Jeffrey. “Budgetary Deceit and America’s Decline.” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
jeffrey-sachs/budgetary-deceit-and-amer_b_907684.html. 2011.<Accessed 24 July 2011>.
Sandel, Michael J. Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy: Harvard University 
Press.1996.
Sanders, Elizabeth. “Antitrust and American Democracy.” The Long Term View, vol. 5, no. 4 (2003).
———. Roots of reform: farmers, workers, and the American state, 1877-1917. Chicago, Il.: University Of 
Chicago Press.1999.
Sarasohn, David. “The Election of 1916: Realigning the Rockies.” Western Historical Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3 
(1980).
Satterthwaite, Ann. Going shopping: Consumer choices and community consequences. New Haven, MA.: 
Yale University Press.2001.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Politics of Upheaval. Boston, MA.: Houghton Mifflin.1960.
———. The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom. 2 ed. London: Andre Deutsch.1970.
Schmalensee, Richard. “Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in U. S. Antitrust.” In How the Chicago School 
Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust, edited by Richard 
Pitofsky, 11-12. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008.
Schoenberg, Shira. “Romney sharpens attacks on Obama in N.H.” Boston.com, http://www.boston.com/
Boston/politicalintelligence/2011/08/romney-sharpens-attacks-obama/nUJQLy5BOWBVvJ8xpvkeKI/
index.html. 2011.<Accessed 9 October 2011>.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. 5th ed. London: Allen and Unwin.1976.
Seltzer, Alan L. “Woodrow Wilson as ‘Corporate-Liberal’: Toward a Reconsideration of Left Revisionist 
Historiography.” The Western Political Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2 (1977).
Shergold, Peter R. Working-Class Life: the ‘American standard’ in comparative perspective, 1899-1913. 
Pittsburgh, PA.: University of Pittsburgh Press.1982.
Skitol, Robert A. “The Shifting Sands of Antitrust Policy: Where It Has Been, Where It Is Now, Where It Will 
Be in Its Third Century.” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, vol. 9, no. 1 (1999).
Sklar, Martin J. “Capitalism and Socialism in the Emergence of Modern America: The Formative Era, 1890s-
1916, part 1.” http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-shgape&month=9712&week=
c&msg=TZvkJCJjCvWHTO8QMB%2bEWA&user=&pw=. <Accessed 4 March 2010 >. 1993.
———. “Capitalism and Socialism in the Emergence of Modern America: The Formative Era, 1890s-1916, 
part 2  “ http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-shgape&month=9712&week=d&m
sg=58f8wL31xKeIpYk7M045Bg&user=&pw=. <Accessed 4 March 2010 >. 1993.
———. The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1988.
———. “Periodization and historiography: The United States considered as a developing country.” In The 
United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s, edited 
by Martin J Sklar. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 1992.
———. “Some political and cultural consequences of the disaccumulation of capital: origins of 
postindustrial development in the 1920s.” In The United States as a developing country: Studies in U.S. 
History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s, edited by Martin J. Sklar. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1992.
———. “Thoughts on Capitalism and Socialism: Utopian and Realistic.” The Journal of the Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era, vol. 2, no. 4 (2003).
———. “Woodrow Wilson and the developmental imperatives of modern U. S. liberalism.” In The United 
States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s, edited by 
Martin J Sklar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992.
Skocpol, Theda. Protecting soldiers and mothers: the political origins of social policy in the United States. 
Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.1995.
Skowronek, Stephen. Building a new American state: The expansion of national administrative capacities, 
1877-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1982.
Smith, Adam. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations Oxford: Clarendon Press.1976.
Smith, George. D. From Monopoly to Competition: The Transformations of Alcoa, 1888-1986. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.2003.
Smith, Mark A. American business and political power: public opinion, elections, and democracy. Chicago, Il: 
University of Chicago Press.2000.
Sorkin, Andrew Ross. “On Obama, Wall St. Shows a Reluctance to Commit.” New York Times, 27 June 2011.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 United States Supreme Court Reports 1 (1911).
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
46 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
Stein, Herbert. Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Clinton Washinton, 
DC: American Enterprise Institute.1994.
Stein, Judith. Running steel, running America: Race, economic policy and the decline of liberalism. Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Carolina Press.1998.
Stigler, George J. “The economists and the problem of monopoly.” The American Economic Review, vol. 72, 
no. 2 (1982).
Stiglitz, Joseph H. The Roaring Nineties: Why We’re Paying the Price for the Greediest Decade in History. 
London: Penguin.2004.
Swain, Nigel. Hungary: the rise and fall of feasible socialism. London: Verso Books.1992.
Symonds, Matthew, and Larry Ellison. Softwar: an intimate portrait of Larry Ellison and Oracle. New York, NY.: 
Simon and Schuster.2004.
Teixeria, Ray, and John Haplin. The Progressive Tradition in American Politics. Washington, DC.: Center for 
American Progress.2010.
Thurow, Lester C. Head to head: The coming economic battle among Japan, Europe, and America. Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin.1993.
———. The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.1981.
United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (1945).
United States v. American Tobacco, 221 United States Supreme Court Reports 106 (1911).
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 290 (1897).
Uslander, Eric M. “The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old Romance Restored.” Law and Business 
Review of the Americas, vol. 6 (2000).
Veblen, Thorstein. The theory of business enterprise. New York, NY.: Charles Scriber.1904.
“The Verdict of the Nation.” New York Times, 4 November 1914.
Vietor, Richard. H. K. “Contrived competition: Airline regulation and deregulation, 1925-1988.” The Business 
History Review, vol. 64, no. 1 (1990).
Vogel, David. Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America. New York, NY: Basic 
Books.1989.
———. “The Triumph of Liberal Trade: American Trade Policy in the Postwar Period.” In Taking Stock: 
American Government in the Twentieth Century, edited by Morton Keller and R. Shep Melnick. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 1999.
Webber, Michael. New Deal fat cats: business, labor, and campaign finance in the 1936 presidential election. 
New York, NY.: Fordham University Press.2000.
Weinstein, James. The corporate ideal in the liberal state, 1900-1918. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.1968.
———. The Decline of American Socialism, 1912-1925. New York: Monthly Review Press.1967.
Weir, Margaret. Politics and jobs: The boundaries of employment policy in the United States. Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press.1993.
Welke, Barbara. Recasting American liberty: gender, race, law, and the railroad revolution, 1865-1920. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.2001.
Westen, Drew. “What Happened to Obama?” New York Times, 6 August 2011.
White, Lawrence J. “Trends in Aggregate Concentration in the United States.” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 16, no. 4 (2002).
Whoriskey, Peter. “With executive pay, rich pull away from rest of America.” Washington Post, 18 June 2011.
Whyte, W. The Organization Man. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.1960.
Wilentz, Sean. “20 Years Later: How Bill Clinton Saved Liberalism From Itself.” The New Republic, http://www.
tnr.com/article/politics/95615/clinton-twenty-years-later. 2011.<Accessed 1 October 2011>.
Williams, Lynn. “Reinventing Labor.” Harvard Business Review, vol., no. July-August (1993).
Williams, William A. The Contours of American History. London: Jonathan Cape.1961.
Williamson, James. Federal antitrust policy during the kennedy-Johnson years. New York, NY: Greenwood 
Publishing 1995.
Williamson, Oliver E. The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets, relational contracting. New York, 
NY.: Free Press.1987.
“Wilson the Issue in Many States.” New York Times, 1 November 1914.
Wilson, Woodrow. The new freedom: a call for the emancipation of the generous energies of a people. New 
York, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company.1913.
discovery
application
excellence 47
———. “On Labor.” http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5723. <Accessed 3 May 2010 >. 1912.
Wood, Ellen M. The origin of capitalism: a longer view. London: Verso 2002.
Wright, Erik O. Class, Crisis and the State. London: New Left Books.1978.
Yglesias, Matthew.2010. “Business Executives Are Conservative.”yglesias.thinkprogress. http://yglesias.
thinkprogress.org/2010/08/business-executives-are-conservative. <Accessed 7 August 2010>.
Zappone, Christian. “Wall Street betting on Democratic Congress.” CNN, http://money.cnn.
com/2006/10/31/news/political_donations/index.htm. <Accessed 21 October 2009 >. 2006.
Zorn, Dirk M. “Here a chief, there a chief: the rise of the CFO in the American firm.” American Sociological 
Review, vol. 69, no. 3 (2004).
